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The Secretary of Defense is a powerful cabinet-level official in charge of the financial resources, know-how, staff, and authority to destroy autocratic regimes hostile to the United States once the political decision to do so has been made. Yet, there is no equivalent position in the U.S. government to mobilize the necessary intellectual and physical resources to help construct democratic regimes friendly to the United States in the wake of autocratic collapse or destruction
For FY 2008, the U.S. military budget hovered around $500 billion, not including supplements for Iraq and Afghanistan that brought the total to about $696 billion.110 For the same year, U.S. spending on democracy promotion was estimated to be only $1.5 billion,111 while total spending on foreign assistance as a whole amounted to roughly $20 billion.112 By comparison, under the Marshall Plan, the United State spent roughly $110 billion a year for European reconstruction in equivalent 2007 dollars.
The asymmetries go well beyond budgets and include imbalances in prestige and career advancement. The Secretary of Defense administers a vast bureaucracy of civilian appointees, generals, other military officers, and new recruits. The Pentagon’s military leaders have risen through the ranks of a meritocracy with very clear metrics for promotion. Conversely, the equivalent head of non-military assistance is the Administrator of AID. This Administrator is not a member of the cabinet and does not oversee an organization filled with dozens of political appointees and talented subordinates who have risen through a merit-based hierarchy equivalent to that of the military. Even the title “administrator” underscores the lack of prestige assigned to the job.
They [ AID Steven Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan Mitchel Seligson] estimate that $10 million in democracy and governance spending will raise a country’s Freedom House score by a quarter of a point.
Programs that support civil society and trade unions can trace a fairly straight causal arrow between funding and NGO proliferation.
American campaign industry is large, highly developed, and eager to export its expertise.
Especially after the United States emerged as a world power, other countries were willing to accept American leadership because of a genuine belief in the American commitment to “doing good” in the world.
In the developing world over the past 50 years, there is no correlation between modernization and democratization.
Over the past 10 years, economic modernization in Russia has undermined, not promoted, democratic development.
Despite the relatively few American successes in promoting democracy recently, our rather underdeveloped understanding for how democratization occurs, and the limited resources available for supporting democratic development abroad, this book still aims to make the case that the United States should promote democracy and that, under the right circumstances and with the right policies, the United States can promote democracy.
Inspired by Bush’s rhetoric, democratic activists in Egypt, Iran, Belarus, Syria, Russia, and Azerbaijan took chances and challenged their regimes, believing that Washington would come to their defense. They were let down.
In special circumstances, U.S. officials must be prepared to offer falling autocrats exit out of the country and safe haven to enjoy their retirement from politics. However unjust, safe passage out of the country for an autocratic ruler sometimes can be a necessary condition for peaceful democratic change.
Greater contact between Iranian and American societies in turn would further undermine the regimes’ legitimacy, strengthen the independence of Iranian economic and political groups, and perhaps even compel some regime members to cash out and exchange their diminishing political power for enduring property rights.
this form of direct assistance can make the recipients of AID assistance look like collaborators or agents of the U.S. government.
"In 2002, a Pew Global Attitudes Survey revealed that 70 percent of Americans agreed that the “US should be promoting democracy around the world.” In a 2007 survey, only 23 percent of respondents believed the “US can effectively help other countries become democratic,” while 64 percent thought “democracy is something that countries only come to on their own.”
"Others in this camp contend that promoting democracy can trigger conflict between and within states. “Pushing countries too soon into competitive electoral politics,” Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue, “not only risks stoking war, sectarianism and terrorism, but it also makes the future consolidation of democracy more difficult.”
for the first three decades of AID’s existence, its principal focus remained social and economic development, not democracy promotion.
no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.
Thus the most serious competitor to democracy in the past century and still today is the modernizing autocrat.
In the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarian regimes in Asia’s tigers—Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea—provided a capitalist model for advocates of growth under autocracy. Today, the Chinese economic miracle provides a serious alternative to the legitimacy and attractiveness of democracy.
Proponents of democracy overpromise and ignore empirical reality when they claim that democracies always and everywhere outperform autocracies in developing economies
get richer first, worry about democracy later. For decades, this idea dominated thinking about development assistance in Western aid agencies and international financial institutions.
Although some scholars have posited a positive relationship between democracy and growth, others have found a negative relationship, and a third school has found no relationship at all. In the aggregate, this last finding seems most robust.
In the economic growth race in the developing world, autocracies are the hares and the snails, while democracies are the tortoises. On average, democracies have a slower rate of growth than the best autocratic performers but a much better rate of growth than most autocratic regimes.
In Africa, according to Fareed Zakaria, the introduction of democracy has produced “a degree of chaos and instability that has actually made corruption and lawlessness worse in many countries.
Democracies are not pacifist regimes when dealing with autocracies. But democracies are peaceful when interacting with other democracies.
As Fareed Zakaria, one of the most articulate proponents of this sequencing argument, rightly points out, “liberty came to the West centuries before democracy.
“National unity,” in Dankwart Rustow’s formulation, “must precede all other phases of democratization” and works best as a precondition for democracy “when national unity is accepted un-thinkingly.
Realists argue that democracy promotion can undermine allies, empower anti-American forces, and generate both domestic and international instability. By pushing for democratization, so the argument goes, the United States “might help set forces in motion that it cannot control and that threaten its vital interests.
Without French military intervention in the American Revolution (an instance of military intervention to promote democracy), the United States would not have become an independent country when it did.
Without the illiberal kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a trade partner today, the United States would not have enough affordable energy to support our current way of life.
The North’s occupation of the South after the Civil War might be considered the first instance of the United States using military force to pursue democratic regime change and nation building.
American leaders proclaimed the promotion of freedom a core objective of the American presence in the Philippines. The mission did not go well. In the Philippines, American forces fought a prolonged war against insurgents, resulting in the deaths of 220,000 Filipino soldiers and civilians and 4,000 American soldiers over 14 years.
The American inability to distinguish between anti-colonial movements struggling for independence and Soviet proxies struggling for world communist revolution also led to many strategic errors in fighting the Cold War, including most tragically in Vietnam.
The most detrimental error for American security, however, was Operation Cyclone, the program of covert U.S. support for the mujahadeen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. These so-called freedom fighters were useful U.S. allies in driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but they were hardly Jeffersonian believers, as the world learned when they tried to govern Afghanistan in the early 1990s. On the contrary, their failure to build stable, accountable government helped to bring to power the Taliban, which in turn invited Al Qaeda to set up shop in Afghanistan. That alliance eventually yielded devastating consequences for American national security on September 11, 2001.
Nonetheless, there is no question that managing China’s rise will remain a central concern of American presidents for the next century.
the nature of the political system that emerged in Russia in the 1990s was a weak form of democracy. In the 1990s, radical political and economic change in Russia produced leaders, political forces, and economic interest groups that identified with and benefited from liberal ideas, specifically democratic and market practices at home and integration into Western institutions abroad. Russia’s new leaders also rejected communist and fascist ideologies, building instead economic institutions (including first and foremost, private property rights) and to a lesser extent political institutions designed to constrain illiberal, anti-democratic forces.
Had Russia been ruled by a communist or fascist leader during the 1990s, the United States would have been less likely to pursue NATO enlargement or the bombing of Yugoslavia because of concerns about the potential for armed conflict with Russia.
A country, organization, or individual can be anti-American and pro-democracy at the same time.
The collapse of communism ushered in a giddy era for democracy promoters.
It is hard for the democratic governments and Western NGOs to call for transparency in autocratic governments when they themselves do not operate transparently.
Americans—foreign policymakers and citizens alike—may gain some sense of satisfaction by seeing their country do the right thing, or stand on the right side of history.
a central strategic motivation for obtaining a nuclear weapon is to deter American military intervention.
With more avenues open for peaceful political participation, organizations that practice terrorism would be forced to make strategic decisions about whether or not to pursue their political objectives in accordance with the democratic rules of the game or to remain extra-constitutional, anti-systemic movements.
In the short run, however, democratization has not reduced terrorist attacks either in the Middle East or against Western democracies.
The Saudi government never directly financed Al Qaeda, but Saudi charity organizations with close ties to the government, including charities headed by government officials, did provide direct and indirect support for Al Qaeda and like-minded political groups.
As of 2007, the Iraqi regime was not classified as a democracy.
Ideally, parties are only allowed to participate in elections after they pledge allegiance to the democratic rules of the game and also recognize the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
The American president must continue to speak out in support of democracy and human rights. Shying away from the “d” word in favor of more euphemistic phrases like “good governance” or “human dignity” would send a terrible signal to the activists around the world fighting for human rights and democratic change. Certainly, the United States has to cooperate with illiberal and authoritarian regimes on a wide range of economic, security, and political issues. Americans need Saudi oil, Russian cooperation on reducing the world’s nuclear arsenals, and Chinese computer chips and textiles. In pursuing these transactions, however, American diplomats must not check their values at the door. Consistency also matters. The worst of all worlds is when one cabinet official gives a speech about democracy promotion as a U.S. priority and another senior official downplays its significance.
In Iraq, many American democracy promotion organizations have refused to work in country, and those that do spend up to 40 percent of their budgets on security.
In the Philippines and Chile, aid and technical assistance from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) helped to expose electoral fraud, and in Chile, to assist the opposition in running a successful “NO” campaign during the referendum.55 In South Africa, AID as well as NED, NDI, and other American NGOs provided support and solidarity to the opposition forces.
The factors for success in these cases included (1) a semi-autocratic regime, (2) an unpopular incumbent; (3) a united and organized opposition; (4) an ability by the opposition to expose electoral fraud; (5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote; (6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands of demonstrators to protest electoral fraud; and (7) divisions among the regime’s coercive forces.75 Of these seven factors, the United States played a role in only a few.
These state-to-state relationships helped to dissuade Kuchma and Shevardnadze from cracking down on their opposition movements and also facilitated the work of American non-governmental organizations, which worked with civil society and opposition groups inside both countries.
In the fall of 2003, numerous American envoys tried to convince President Shevardnadze to hold free and fair elections. When he did not, the Bush administration did not immediately denounce the election results, but gradually signaled support for the opposition until they seized power. In the run up to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Bush administration officials also encouraged President Kuchma to hold free and fair elections, and by denying visas to prominent Ukrainian businessmen, signaled to the regime the consequences of a fraudulent vote. These threats did not prevent Kuchma from trying to steal the vote, but they may have helped to constrain the president and his entourage from using force against the demonstrators. Indirectly, American-supported media outlets’ reports on Kuchma’s involvement in the killing of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the vast corruption of Shevardnadze’s Georgian government also helped to undermine the popularity and power of these leaders.
NDI and IRI played active roles in encouraging cooperation among the democratic groups in Serbia and Ukraine, though less so in Georgia. They did so by collecting and then sharing survey data, which underscored the electoral advantage of a single candidate. In both countries, this data pointed to the need to back particular candidates—Voijislav Kostunica in Serbia and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine rather than the more charismatic opposition leaders in both countries at the time (Zoran Djinjic in Serbia and Yulia Timoshenko in Ukraine).
The scale of the resources involved in grant-making also distorts the labor market in poor societies, making it more lucrative to work for a Western-funded NGO than to head a local NGO or government agency without external support.
American advisors have played central roles in revising commercial codes throughout the developing world, but with limited spillover to democracy and human rights.
The U.S. government also should establish a network of civilian democracy and state-building specialists, similar to the National Guard, who could be deployed to transitional settings. In addition, a special fund—a democracy dividend—should be set aside to provide rapid financial aid to those governments making the transition to democracy.
Who would argue that clean water is not more important to people in poor countries than the right to vote? Who would disagree that freedom from death in a combat zone is more valuable than the right to free assembly?
To better integrate economic and political development aid, the United States needs to make economic assistance conditional upon a country making progress on governance reforms, including democratic reforms.
Soldiers should not kill terrorists one day and teach Jeffersonian democracy the next.
Diplomats should not negotiate a basing agreement with a government one day and then turn around the next and approve funding for an opposition leader to that same government.
for-profit companies should not be allowed to bid to do civil society assistance work,
independent scholars have conducted remarkably few systematic analyses or comprehensive assessments of how U.S. foreign policy, including democracy assistance programs, has helped advance the development of democracy worldwide.
To fight the decades-long battle against communism, the United States invested billions of dollars in education and intelligence. The U.S. government sponsored centers of Soviet studies, provided foreign-language scholarships in Russian and Eastern European languages, and offered dual-competency grants to get graduate students to acquire expertise both in security issues and in Russian culture.
After the collapse of communism in Europe, the Clinton administration explicitly called for NATO enlargement as a mechanism for expanding the democratic community of states.
In many parts of the world today, the U.N. has a better brand name than American election-monitoring NGOs. Most Americans (68 percent) also support the idea of promoting democracy “by working through the UN because such efforts will be more legitimate.”
Consequently, the World Bank and other development banks must devote a greater fraction of their resources to programs that help to build state institutions, including democratic institutions. As the largest shareholder in the World Bank, the United States must exercise its “property rights” to press for this reorientation. A first signal of credible commitment to the effort would be the introduction of the word “democracy” into the bank’s lexicon.
The counterproductive practice of requiring the AID label to appear on AID-funded projects must end.
international NGOs, especially in the human rights field, have built informal networks with local NGOs to pressure bad governments into performing better
Some have even spawned professional NGOs such as the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) in Serbia, which is dedicated to exporting successful ideas and methods for democratic change.
While few of these dictators would argue against democracy as a value or system of government, they do rail against exporters of democracy as illegitimate, illegal, and imperial.
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