The mighty first-March message of Putin leaves no stone unturned from the further fate of the frankly incompetent prime minister. Or, if you turn around differently - incapacitated prime minister will not leave a stone in the stone from this message.

Since last autumn, the President's Administration has an agreed package of documents on the merger of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts.The project has almost no opponents, except that the chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Zorkin in December expressed cautious protest.

The super court will have to combine three instruments after the elections: lawmaking (for which the Supreme Arbitration Court was responsible earlier), correction of judicial errors (the Supreme Court) and interpretation of the Constitution (actually the Constitutional Court). In order for the super court to appear, you need to edit the Constitution a little, correct several laws and designate a figure of a suitable caliber there.From the point of view of many, the next place of work of Premier Dmitry Medvedev has long been determined.

It is harder to come up with a candidate than Medvedev, and there will not be any difficulties with the appointment. The Prime Minister will not have to go through humiliating conversations with deputies of the State Duma (the Constitutional Court appoints the Federation Council), nor ask for a certificate of legal experience from the St. Petersburg Bar Association. A fifteen-year experience of civil service is a sufficient reason to become a judge of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, against the backdrop of many other reputations, Medvedev is an angel, and absolutely absolutely "irreproachable" in the country at all.

However, today it is more interesting not for the future place of Medvedev's work and not his term for the post of prime minister, but his political biography itself.

Medvedev is 52 years old, he emerged from the reception room Sobchak Vladimir Putin, meteor swept the Russian political sky, worked as prime minister, president - and now, it seems, is sitting at the broken trough. One of the most liberal politicians under Putin, he managed to lose the trust of the intelligentsia, his class, to quarrel with other liberals from Putin's entourage, to increase the number of enemies among the siloviki, and so on. What's wrong with Medvedev?

The answer to this question seems to be quite simple: Medvedev has long been working on posts that do not quite correspond. The deputy head of the Kremlin administration is obviously his position. The "social" vice prime minister is no longer entirely. Medvedev does not know how to "talk to people," that is, pretend to listen attentively and resolutely responds to simple requests and complaints from citizens.

He is also not inclined to hardware work: he simply does not have enough hardware to beat such crappy paper monsters as Igor Sechin or Sergei Sobyanin. And Medvedev's managerial skills are far from ideal: many officials who worked with him say that he loves to listen to himself more than others. His career is an example of how the gap between social competencies and a post looks: you do not need to be a liberal or a statesman to notice this.

The explanation should not start with the question "what's wrong?", But with the question "why all the same?". Why does Medvedev work where he works? In American politics today one of the most important is the notion of "surrogate" - a person representing the position of US President Trump for the audience of a particular media. Medvedev was the perfect surrogate, Putin's avatar: the safest, generally non-initiative, smooth-spoken and not ashamed to change his views after his original.

When Putin still needed decent (by Western standards) surrogates, Medvedev easily beat on this field and Kudrin, and Surkov, and Sechin. For his words, which he still likes very much to say, nothing stood and costs nothing, except for these words themselves. Medvedev today, like in 2009, is a policy for which PR, media, rhetoric - and there is politics. What others use as tools to achieve goals, Medvedev understands as the goal.

But it's not just the personal qualities of the prime minister and the degree of their danger to his patron. Medvedev is a vivid representative of the class who, by chance, first received a monopoly on power in Russia, and then split in two: some went to the Kremlin, others went to the opposition.

Both Khodorkovsky, Kudrin, Shuvalov, and Prokhorov come from this stratum: some parents were on the middle floors of the Soviet elite, some were headed by university chairs, but in general they were not much different from each other. And what is today called the elite is the children of this part of the Soviet intelligentsia, brought up in an atmosphere of "sycophancy in front of the West" and a weak-willed compromise with a conscience.

They did not shoot the White House, Yeltsin shot them for them. They do not appoint and arrest security officials, these are the siloviki who put them - and sometimes each other. In the case of Medvedev, this thesis is confirmed by the fact that the notorious effect of the presidential chair, which he held for four years, did not work. The power in Russia (truly dark matter), as it turned out, does not "warm" anyone who has it: greatness or at least its prosthesis in the form of a high rating - the attributes of personality, not furniture. And in 2009, and now Putin had and has more power than Medvedev, although in 2009 the first was a subordinate of the second.

Power as a bet, as a challenge and as a fate, is not the destiny of the intelligentsia. This, perhaps, is the main conclusion that can be drawn from Medvedev's political biography. After leaving the departments and out of the classrooms, the children of the intelligentsia were as greedy, vain and arrogant as non-intellectuals, and Putin was a frank "non-intellectual". But they were never sufficiently solid, therefore their role, even sometimes very important, is always the second.

The refusal of the second presidential term in 2011 was due to Medvedev's fidelity to their word: if Putin wants to return to the Kremlin, Medvedev must give in. The reason for Putin's return was dissatisfaction with Medvedev's actions: a pro-Western course, a position on Libya, inattention to the power establishment.

But now the matter is no longer in the position and actions - but in the absence of both, from Medvedev. He did not begin to otmazyvat his minister Ulyukaev, showing that he does not have a sense of elbow with his subordinates. I did not join the work on the new economic strategy: the government could not figure out how to make new national projects without money, with sanctions and against the background of the economic crisis.

Even the story of the appointment of the new minister of economic development passed Medvedev: Oreshkin was appointed not by casting motivated candidates, but by a residual principle. And the prime minister with all his kind showed that to him this whole situation is not very interesting.

Medvedev's fatalism, which is understandable and understandable for a person who has been living political after-life for six years, is unforgivable in the framework of that bizarre logic that the president of the country enjoys today. Enthusiasm at the top is nowhere to take: Putin has done everything to discourage enthusiasts (reforms, privatization and nationalization) from fountaining ideas and projects.

But the President nevertheless requires some sort of personal pressure, and the scene seems to unfold in the direction of those who are ready to demonstrate it. Yes, Vorobyov, Dumin, Kadyrov have little experience, although there are many sins, but they play political games as if they are still able to enjoy them. Fatigue and frustration are not in fashion; in fashion - the fourth term, new horizons, rhetorical rhetoric and other signs of renewal of the political landscape.

But that does not mean that Medvedev is leaving the stage. He, who once came to Olympus due to his political impotence, as a successful compromise figure for all fighters, including western sharks - "knows too much" to be thrown down.

Hence the persistent rumor about a new majestic sinecure created specially for him - the united "supreme court".

Perhaps, it is there that this fan of fashionable costumes and gadgets, the best former friend of businessmen and intellectuals, will prove himself to be truly useful updated to the Putin message of the power vertical. That is, in his favorite quality not to do exactly anything significant will embody an ancient saying: "If you want to help - do not bother!"

Based on Konstantin Gaase,

OPINION

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