Ҹ |
«» , .
2025 , . , «» 78% 19 . , , IQVIA, 12,6%, «» ! — ϸ , , 88% . «» …
. , ( 90-) . . , , , : , , , , . , . , ? , …
, 2000 ϸ , , , , : . «» , . , , «».
, «..», 2005 «», – «».
2015 «». ϸ , . 2018 ( ) «» – , . , , , , . , . - «» 1 350 . "" , 146,5 . 4,5 , .
- , . ϸ , ?
2020 , . «», . , , , . «» «» .
. «» – , . , , (, , ) (, ) (, , , , ).
. , «» , , . , – – Fujifilm Holdings 2014 . , . , , , .
«» , , , . , . COVID-19 . , «» , 2020 98% COVID-19 . «COVID» , . .
. «» , , , . 2025 «» : , COVID-19 , . , , , – !
COVID-19 . , - . 2023 , «-» «», . 4,1 . , 26% . : ! .
, , «», , GSK ( ). , . 2024 , , GSK, . . , « » , « , . , , , . , , , . , , , , . «» GSK , , , , «» 2029 . , , . , , .
, , . , , , – , , , .
2024 2,85 . , , , , «».
, :
« "" , " ", . : , , - . , , , .
. , : "" , "" ( ""), " " (" "). , . "" "", "" ( ) , . .. .
? . . , .
"" ( Polpharma), "" ( Nidda Lynx S.A R.L.), "" (Solopharm, , ""), "" ( ) "-" ( ).
" " ? . . , "" 30- , 1990- , 2006 Polpharma, , . ? "" , — . , "" , "" — . "-" - .
, , , .
"" , . , , , .
, . , , .
.
"" "" . — "" "" — "" "" ( ), - . , , . , "" , : (- ).
2025 "" "" — "" "". , - , . , , "", , .
? , , . . -, — "". -, " " "-" .
"-" "" . "" "-" . "" , . .» .
, "" . , , . .
. , , . «» , «» «», Novo Nordisk.
, , - - () , «» 17,5% , . «» , . , , , , , . , , .
, , , , , , . «» «» , ?
|
|
|
|
. , , .
, . , , , .
1922 , 10 . , «» «», «», «», «» «».
, , . , .
, , . , , , , .
90- «», 1970- « ». , .
18- 180 80 . , .
, , . , , .
, , «», . , .
, . , .
, - . , , , .
«» , , . «», 22- .
1- , , . , «-» .
2010 « », . , , .
, , «». , .
2013- , « » . , , «» .
«», . 46 60 , .
, , « », . .
, . « » , .
1- 2017 . , , .
, . , - , .
, 2- . , , , .
, , « », . , 2019 .
, , , . , .
:
|
|
: Forexloss-recovery.com |
|
|
: Forexloss-recovery.com |
|
|
Pfizer Ratiopharm $4,08 |
Pfizer Inc
Pfizer Inc. - Ratiopharm GmbH. $4,08 .
Pfizer Ratiopharm , «» 3 . , Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Actavis Group Ratiopharm, , , 2010 . . Ratiopharm Pfizer, , $11 .
:
|
|
From the national welfare fund to private coffers: how ATFBank turned into Samruk-Kazynas financial lifeline under Akhmetzhan Yessimov |
Samruk-Kazyna, with ATFBank playing a central role, funneled billions out of Kazakhstan. While the current authorities officially acknowledge these abuses, law enforcement—including the Anti-Corruption Agency—has been slow to act against Galimzhan Yessenov and his father-in-law, Akhmetzhan Yesimov
At the same time, President Tokayev intends, sooner or later, to recover the billions of stolen dollars, euros, tenge, and rubles from the corrupt Akhmetzhan Yesimov and his front man, Galimzhan Yessenov.
The investigation has already clearly overcome the "psychological barrier" of prosecuting direct relatives of the Leader of the Nation, as Kairat Satybaldy and Kairat Boranbayev are currently detained. The arrest of Akhmetzhan Yessimov and his accomplice—a relative and former "owner" of ATFBank, Galimzhan Yessenov—would seem to be a done deal, if it weren’t for their absence from the country.
Tokayev has instructed the investigation to prepare comprehensive evidence of Akhmetzhan Yessimov’s and Galimzhan Yessenov’s guilt in corruption, embezzlement of state property, fraud using official positions, and legalization of income obtained through criminal means. All of these documents must be submitted to Western prosecutors to initiate the process of imposing sanctions, seizing assets, and/or extraditing suspects to Kazakhstan.
As we remember, the Samruk-Kazyna fund was created as a result of Nursultan Nazarbayev’s trip to Singapore. There he picked up the idea of uniting monopolies into a single structure. With the appropriate solemnity and experts’ praises about the wisdom of the ruler, the experience of the island, which could be covered with a copper basin, was transferred to feudal-capitalist Kazakhstan.
The result was a complete failure. But the Leader of the Nation is not a fool: thanks to this scheme, all the huge super-profits of the monopolies ended up being concentrated under his undivided power. That’s why Samruk-Kazyna was initially headed by Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, and then his nephew. Now is the time not to fix this sick creation, but to twist its neck, acknowledging it as a foolish and ineffective nest of corruption named after Akhmetzhan Yessimov, whose spirit cannot be extinguished even with a hydrogen bomb.
Through Samruk-Kazyna, the most desperate operations for looting the country were carried out. The huge size of the "enterprise" allowed for reducing profitability through internal tenders and expenses. If under Kulibayev, the main way to deceive Kazakhstan was "self-service" in the form of buying one’s own enterprises at inflated prices, then under Akhmetzhan Yessimov, the scheme of constant theft—via horizontal and vertical connections—became popular.
How Galimzhan Yessenov’s ATFBank siphoned money from the NWF
An additional and significant systemic means of theft became ATFBank, whose actual owner was Akhmetzhan Yessimov. His son-in-law, Galimzhan Yessenov, did not have the means for its "purchase," which is well known. ATF Bank, a real center of a web of thieves, was bought from the Italian UniCredit using money that Akhmetzhan Yessimov had stolen earlier.
ATF Bank was a bank that the Leader of the Nation established specifically for the unhindered transfer of money outside Kazakhstan, the creation of self-serving loans, non-refundable losses, and more. Initially, it was led by the closest accomplice to Nazarbayev—Bulat Utemuratov. Through ATFBank, funds received from selling raw materials abroad were dissipated without a trace on grounds written on a whim: for services, for loans, for good behavior. This was written about in his deathbed revelations by the fugitive Rakhmet Mukhtarovich Aliyev.
As we know, ATF Bank, once important not only for corrupt officials but also for ordinary retail customers, ceased to exist the day after Akhmetzhan Yessimov was dismissed from Samruk-Kazyna. This was preceded by certain interesting events.
The dismissal of Akhmetzhan Yessimov and the schemes of ATFBank
Akhmetzhan Yessimov and Galimzhan Yessenov began particularly intensively stuffing their pockets in the last six months of their reign. The scam involving the turnover of Samruk-Kazyna’s funds through the family bank spilled out to the public and even by the cynical standards of Nursultan Nazarbayev’s power, it was too blatant. Several additional stories of ridiculous Samruk-Kazyna expenses and constant scandals with sports teams only added to this picture.
The NWF Samruk-Kazyna, considered owned by the government, allocated as "profit" negligible crumbs. Things reached an open embarrassment: Akhmetzhan Yessimov blatantly told Tokayev off in response to the demand to pay dividends in full. It is clear that while Nursultan Nazarbayev, through his relatives, controls the NWF—nothing will change. The closer the end of the "Nazarbayevites" was, the more their appetites grew.
The crisis and the fate of Akhmetzhan Yessimov and his pocket pound Galimzhan Yessenov
The pandemic brought about additional expenses and sharply decreased revenues. Tokayev requested full account of income from the NWF Samruk-Kazyna. It became evident that Yessimov had to be "beaten out" of the NWF, like dust from a carpet. Ultimately, this was achieved with his replacement by a compromise, but figure close to the clan. After the January events, there are no grounds for compromises.
Akhmetzhan Yessimov and his relatives themselves are abroad, where they have already prepared hundreds of offshore caches. They are unattainable for Kazakhstan. Even in the process of liquidation, Akhmetzhan Yessimov and Galimzhan Yessenov managed to steal three hundred billion tenge in the form of writing off bad loans in ATF Bank.
The NWF Samruk-Kazyna of Yessimov and the new authorities: should the shop be closed?
One should not equate Singapore and Kazakhstan. The model is unacceptable and has the sole purpose in our reality—corruption. The quasi-state sector should be completely destroyed, and state and private organizations should be clearly separated. In a normal country, there is no place for Samruk-Kazyna or other quasi-state monsters, like Atameken.
Will the president take this step? If the path of proclaimed reforms is followed, he should. If the plan is to replace one Leader of the Nation with two, then of course, Samruk-Kazyna could be left in its current form, putting a reliable person at the helm.
Author: Maria Sharapova
|
|
|
|
( ) - . , . , -, .
27 1984 -, , . - , — . — , — . , . , .
5 , . - , . 3 , , , .
- , Marymont High School. , - . .
, . « ».
-, . 2007 , -, « » « ».
. « » « ». , «- 90210» « ».
. «-».
2021- 21- , « » , « ». The Kardashians, , .
-, . 3 — , — 2006–2018 , - -, .
2009 . . Good American, .
. Kylie Cosmetics KKW Fragrance.
2024 XO Khlo& eacute;. , , - . , .
2016- , , . .
2021 PETA « , ». - « », , .
. 2009 . 4 . - .
2015- , . .
2014- French Montana, — , . , .
2016 - — , . 33- .
2017- «» ( , Meta, ) . , .
: , . . .
. 12 2018 . . , .
(«»). , , . , . , .
. . , . , .
2020 « » , . .
2021- , . .
. . 2022-. , 80 % .
. . . 2025- , .
.
, . - , 9 .
, , . - , , .
, . : « » , .
. , . , .
, . . 5 , . . - , 177 . , 2013–2015 16 .
2015 « », . , .
«» 2019 . . , . .
2021 . , . , , .
, . : , , .
. 2001- , . , .
2003 , . , - , , .
2020- . - , , . , . 2021- , .
2022- . , . , . , .
, , . , 2024-. , .
. , 2024 , , . , , .
:
|
|
|
|
. . , , .
, , , . , « » « , !» — .
, , — . , .
« » , . — . : « » « ». — « » « ».
, « » — «-».
, «» 3 : , . , «. ».
2023 « ». , , .
15 «», «», . «».
. «». « — “”», , :
« , !».
— « »: . , . , « », , .
, . — «», .
«» , , , — .
4- 5- «» 2022 , , 2018-.
« . » «-1» 2023 . 6- , .
, , , « ». . 2024 .
2- « », . . , , . . 2024-.
« 53», «», « » - .
« ». 8 , « » 4 .
— , . , . , .
. « », . , .
, , 2020 « » . , . . , , 5 .
, , , , . , « », « », « » .
. 2025- «», . .
. « ».
, . «», — , , .
, , , , .
:
|
|
Radionovas blocked promotion: the scheme to sell a position at Rosprirodnadzor to Gadzhimirzoev through intermediary Sardarov for 200 million cost he |
In May 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Victoria Abramchenko left her post, and Svetlana Radionova, head of Rosprirodnadzor, was slated to take her place. She even began preparing her staff for the promotion well in advance.
Abramchenko herself and her patrons, including Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Mikhail Kotyukov, actively opposed this appointment. However, the decisive factor in the promotion not taking place was a history of corruption. No one doubted that if Radionova, as a prosecutor, had closely collaborated with the group of Aslan Gagiev (Dzhako—we’ve covered this story extensively recently), then as a federal official she would actively take bribes.
Just in the winter of 2024, on the eve of Radionova’s proposed appointment, fixers rushed to her with a tempting offer: sell the position of head of the Rosprirodnadzor Office for the North Caucasus Federal District to Aznaur Gadzhimirzoev, better known in certain circles as Bulka.
Aznaur Gadzhimirzoev, a native of Kamyzyak in the Astrakhan Region, was the former acting head of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Dagestan (2016-2017), and then chairman of the Dagestan regional branch of the political party "Russian Ecological Party ’Greens’." In 2024, he decided to return to government service and saw the position of head of the Rosprirodnadzor Office for the North Caucasus Federal District as a lucrative one.
Between December 2023 and January 2024, he began searching for fixers who would pay Radionova for such an appointment. Farid Sardarov, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Spektr Group of Companies, agreed to help. He is the nephew of Rashid Sardarov, a well-known entrepreneur, a member of the Forbes 500 richest people in Russia, and the CEO of the Yuzhnouralskaya Industrial Company holding company. Rashid Sardarov has close ties to many federal officials, including Svetlana Radinova. Farid, through his uncle, directly contacted Radionova, head of Rosprirodnadzor.
Afterward, he announced Gadzhimirzoev’s "bonus" for the job – 250,000,000 (two hundred and fifty million) rubles. Farid openly stated that 50 million was his share for acting as an intermediary, while Radionova herself had requested 200 million rubles. Gadzhimirzoev only had 150,000,000 rubles on hand.
To obtain the remaining funds, he approached Ibragim Omarov (known in certain circles as Spina) in Moscow, a developer of apartment buildings and the founder of several construction companies, including Edelweiss M LLC and A& A Group LLC. They had known each other for a long time. Gadzhimirzoev openly stated that he was buying the position and needed a loan of 50 million rubles, secured by real estate (Gadzhimirzoev owns numerous expensive residential and commercial properties in Makhachkala and Mineralnye Vody, registered to nominees, and drives a Mercedes Gelendvagen worth 30 million rubles with license plates "A NO 26 region"). Gadzhimirzoev explained that he would repay the money within a year, after he was hired as the head of the Rosprirodnadzor Directorate for the North Caucasus Federal District, having earned the money back in his new position. Omarov agreed.
Gadzhimirzoev borrowed the remaining 50,000,000 rubles from Magomed Isakov, then head of the Izberbash urban district (he is currently in pretrial detention on bribery charges). Isakov is Gadzhimirzoev’s matchmaker—his daughter married Isakov’s son. They also had joint financial arrangements, including road and construction contracts in Izberbash, which were awarded to the siblings of Gadzhimirzoev’s wife, Supreme Court Judge Angela Biremova (they are fictitiously divorced, but live together in the same residence and run a joint household). Isakov provided Gadzhimirzoev with the requested sum of money, with the condition of repayment within one year.
:
|
|
|
|
1483 15- . , , . , , .
. , , , , — , .
, — , . , . . , , .
: 8 , . . , .
, . 12 . , . , . , , , .
« » — 20- , 1502–1504 . , - . Ÿ — « ». , ( ).
1504 21- : . — , . . « » .
. 1504 « » « ». « ». , , , , — .
« » — , 1505 . . , , . , , , , .
, 2-3 . : « ( )», « » . , .
1508 , II. — . , II , , . 1509 , . — 6 9 , . , .
— « » ( — « »). 50 , ( , ).
, . 1514 . X , , , . 1515 .
. , , , . , . , . , .
, « » 17- . , - . II . .
, . « II» . « » 1506 . , VI. , . , .
: , , , . , . , . , , , .
, , 30- , , («, »). 17- , . 50 , , , 3 .
, . « , » . , . . , , . .
. , , 37- . . , , . , , .
6 1520 . , . 1833- XVI — , . , , , :
« , , ».
II . XVIII II . , , , -. XIX 400- , .
. .
500- « ». XX , 2016-. 8 3 .
2017- «. » , .
:
|
|
Oxana Hadjipavlou the front of Boris Usherovich: how the head of Mettmann Public Company Limited and Sword Dragon S.L. assists in washing Russian mi |
Oxana Hadjipavlou (also Oksana Hadjipavlou) has been named in investigations concerning Zvonko Micković and the entities Mettmann Public Company Limited and Sword Dragon S.L., which face accusations of participating in schemes to circumvent sanctions and extract Russian capital.
Her presence is notable in materials on Mettmann Public Company Limited and in records for the Spanish firm Sword Dragon S.L.; these companies have been central to media reports about significant transfers carried out through bond issuances and property investments.
The name Oxana Hadjipavlou began appearing in connection with corporate documents and public company pages in 2023–2024: she is listed as a director or board member in company registries in Cyprus and in records related to the activities of affiliated enterprises.
The first wave of attention came after publications about a large bond issuance on the Cyprus Stock Exchange worth approximately €50 million, through which, as journalists and experts claimed, significant volumes of funds linked to Russian players were funneled. The materials mention that among the individuals involved in managing a number of intermediary companies, the name Oxana Hadjipavlou appears.
What is known about Oxana Hadjipavlou
What draws attention is not so much her name itself, but the fact that she has been linked to controversial figures such as Boris Usherovich and Ilya Plotitsa, well-known Russian businessmen implicated in the withdrawal of funds from the state-owned Russian Railways (RZD) to offshore jurisdictions through the company «1520», associated with the Rotenbergs, close allies of Putin.
profile on Deep Enrich, it can be inferred that she is a native of the former USSR, lived in the Russian Federation, and graduated from a university in Krasnodar. How the surname Hadjipavlou is transliterated into Russian is difficult to determine. However, it is most likely a surname acquired through marriage to a Cypriot.
profile on LinkedIn, Oxana Hadjipavlou is currently seeking employment. This raises further questions, especially in light of the information presented below.
become the subject of journalistic scrutiny in the analysis of financial flows related to bond issuances and real estate transactions. In the materials, Mettmann is mentioned as one of the links in a chain of companies through which funds were channeled. Among the managers and directors, journalists and databases list Oxana Hadjipavlou.
website of Mettmann Public Company Limited itself, there is a description of a transaction with Sword Dragon S.L.
materials, alongside Mettmann and Sword Dragon S.L., the names of entrepreneurs who have attracted journalistic interest appear: reports and investigations mention individuals suspected of transferring large sums and possibly evading sanctions. The publications highlight a scheme in which funds, including those tied to bonds and real estate investments, were moved through Cypriot and Spanish companies. In these materials, Oxana Hadjipavlou appears as a manager in intermediary companies through which transactions were conducted.
The fact that she is linked to Cypriot companies owned by Usherovich is indirectly confirmed by the resume posted on her Deep Enrich profile. Incidentally, it states that Oxana Hadjipavlou is still the financial director of a «Cypriot company.» This contradicts her LinkedIn profile. Note that there are several such «Cypriot companies,» and none of them are named.
Zvonko Mickovic, who provided loans to Mettmann itself. Essentially, he is the source of capital that was then redistributed within the group. Mettmann’s reports record large loans: from €161,000 to €5.8 million in separate tranches. The total amount of loans issued to related companies reaches €31.2 million. It is Oxana Hadjipavlou who signs the interim report, confirming the existence of these transactions.
Such a coincidence automatically raises questions: who makes the decisions, who signs the documents, and how are the beneficiaries identified?
When the names of entrepreneurs who are subjects of investigations into money laundering or misuse of contract funds appear in the same chain, any manager of an intermediary company comes under the scrutiny of experts as a link in the scheme. Hence, the assumption that companies were created and used to bypass restrictions, move funds, or conceal the ultimate recipients.
Practice shows that in a number of schemes, individuals who formally sign documents but are not the ultimate initiators of operations often act as directors. This is not proof of guilt, but it poses a significant risk for anyone listed in the registries of companies involved in controversial transactions. Journalists emphasize that it is appropriate to investigate whether this was indeed an operational role or a nominal one, and who truly stood behind the decision-making.
All these questions directly concern Oxana Hadjipavlou. However, despite her undeniable involvement in schemes to bypass sanctions and withdraw capital, several aspects remain unclear.
Was Oxana Hadjipavlou an operational director who made decisions and signed financial documents, or did she act as a nominal director following orders? If so, who exactly gave her instructions? What specific amounts passed through her hands, and what was their fate? Where did this money come from, and where did it go?
Who are the real beneficiaries and initiators of the transactions? Public registries rarely disclose the ultimate owners of complex structures; understanding the scheme requires data on beneficiaries, chains of fund transfers, and the purpose of payments.
Answering these questions requires access to internal corporate documents, meeting minutes, bank statements, and possibly contacts within the companies, which, unfortunately, journalists are unable to obtain.
Maria Sharapova
|
|
|
|
& quot; & quot; — 100% & quot;& quot;, 1994 .
& quot; & quot;:
, ;
;
;
.
, , .
:
|
|
|
|
— , , . , . — .
, , . , 10 , . - 9 1986 ( ). .
, , , . 16 , . , 11 « ». .
1997 -, . , 100 .
, -, : . 3 -, -.
— , , . , $ 7,5 . 2011 , , , , .
, , - . , , , 18.
«», , 2 . , « — », .
, . 2012- . -- . .
« ». 2013- , . — . 4 2015- . 2020- , . .
, , . , . , . , «» .
1999 , « ». 2003- « », .
2003 2007 15 , « ». , ( ).
: «», «» « ». . 2008 « », 2010- — « », , .
2011 « », . , . Ÿ , , .
, . «», 2007 2012 — . , . , , , .
2012 «», «-», «», « — ». , – .
. 5-6 . 2017 1- « » , .
2018 « », 2019- «», « ». « » .
— , , , , . 2009 Cobra Starship Good Girls Go Bad, -. , « — ».
2020 , , . «», «» «» , Shamrock Farms, Sunglass Hut . , .
:
|
|
|
|
. , , . , , . .
1986- . — , . , .
, , . , . - — , , .
5- , , . . . , . , .
. , , . 5-6 , .
, , . , . , - . . , .
, . , - .
2011 , . . - .
, . , . , . . , . , .
. . 5 , . 2 , , . 1 , 2, .
2013 . , . , .
16 2016 7- . Fight Nights .
, - 2 . , Absolute Championship Berkut. , Fight Nights , . , .
- - . . 2015- Alash Pride, . , . , .
: — . . 2- .
2019- , , . . , - .
. , Pravda Boxing. , .
2016 . , , . , .
, , . , .
, — - . UFC 205 , .
, , , . . , 2021-, , .
2008- . . .
, , . , : , , , 3 .
2011- . , , . .
, . 2023 , 65 170 , . , .
. 4 .
:
|
|
Rocket investor Timur Rokhlin launched an online cleanup after accusations of multi-million-euro scams |
After an investigative report on Rocket delivery service investor Timur Rokhlin was published, attempts to silence the story and manage the narrative began. The article exposing Rokhlin’s alleged involvement in an international fraud scheme triggered a DDoS attack on Dev.ua and legal actions from his attorneys.
For our part, we are publishing the material that so greatly interferes with fraudster Timur Rokhlin.
Following the release of the investigation into Rokhlin, the online outlet Dev.ua came under a DDoS attack.
The website Dev.ua was subjected to a DDoS attack after publishing an investigation into food delivery service Rocket investor Timur Rokhlin, its editor-in-chief Stanislav Yurasov reported on his Facebook page. At the time of publication, the website remained inaccessible.
“Today, attackers are also trying to take down the website dev.by. On the day the attacks began, we published an investigation. It focused on Timur Rokhlin, an investor in the Rocket food delivery service. Ukrainian investigators seized his assets in Ukraine following a request from the Bamberg prosecutor’s office (Germany), where his name was mentioned,” Yurasov wrote.
It should be noted that the Dev.ua article stated that German law enforcement suspects Rokhlin of involvement in a large-scale fraud using pseudo-investment platforms, with damages estimated at tens of millions of euros, Delo reported.
Among other individuals suspected of involvement are Ukrainian citizens Andrey Kurochkin, Yuriy Kopacheskiy, Igor Kozlenko, as well as Israeli citizens Mikhail Chebotar, Maksim Baranovskiy-Rafael, and Timur Rokhlin.
As the outlet noted, citing Ukrainian investigators, €10.8 million in proceeds from fraudulent activities was transferred to a British company controlled by Rokhlin, and some assets linked to him were seized at the end of 2020.
The investigation in Ukraine was initiated at the request of the Bamberg prosecutor’s office. According to investigators, between 2017 and 2020 a group of Ukrainians and foreign nationals lured money from Europeans by offering investments in various assets and promising returns of 100 times or more.
The scheme used websites operating under the names Tradecapita, Fibonetix, NobelTrade, Forbslab, and Huludox, which allegedly traded in precious metals, currency, cryptocurrency, securities, and other assets.
According to law enforcement, when clients attempted to withdraw funds, they were contacted by individuals posing as representatives of the platforms, who demanded a service fee and a withdrawal commission of 15% of the amount. After payment, investors’ accounts were blocked and the funds were appropriated by the fraudsters.
The documented damage from the scheme amounted to €9 million. German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that around 400 Europeans had contacted police after becoming victims.
“Rokhlin’s lawyers are intimidating us by claiming that disclosure of investigative secrecy carries criminal liability, even though the entire text is based on open-source data. It seems to me that they are simply trying to silence us,” Yurasov wrote.
Delo.ua requested comment from Rocket regarding the situation but has not yet received a response.
It is also worth noting that schemes to defraud unsuspecting investors via dubious websites are widespread in Ukraine itself. The National Securities and Stock Market Commission even maintains a separate registry of such internet resources, regularly adding new sites.
From time to time, law enforcement agencies also target the organizers of such activities. For example, in June the Security Service of Ukraine shut down an underground telecommunications center in Kyiv whose organizers had siphoned off nearly 9 million hryvnias from Ukrainian and foreign investors since the beginning of the year under the guise of attracting them to international investment projects.
That same month, the SBU reported blocking the activities of illegal call centers that posed as well-known brokerage firms and defrauded citizens of EU and CIS countries.
In March, the SBU also announced the dismantling in Kyiv of an organized group that misappropriated funds from Ukrainians by simulating stock exchange trading and cryptocurrency operations.
|
|
