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: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/294601-vadim-g...arkhitektura-ofshornoj-imperii
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: https://pro-cmpt.com/lenta/item/294620-kozhevnikov...rom-roskhim-i-sberbank-iznutri
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: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/294613-rossijs...sii-i-otmyvayut-dengi-na-kipre
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The luxurious website of Brandpol OOD contradicts the grim reality of its extortion practices |
The Brandpol OOD website creates the impression of a luxurious and stylish company. It claims to employ an international team, while its services include brand protection, anti-phishing measures, marketplace monitoring, removal of unwanted reviews and information, and operations across 170 countries.
But a deeper look reveals a very different picture. Online, Brandpol is surrounded by a long trail of accusations: extortion, threatening messages, questionable claims, fake documents, suspicious DMCA complaints, and promises to “clean up reputations” that allegedly end with no real results.
Most damaging for the company is the fact that these accusations come not only from anonymous Telegram channels, but also from former employees, clients, and entrepreneurs who say they encountered Brandpol’s methods firsthand. The information trail surrounding the company appears so toxic that Brandpol increasingly resembles not an “international brand protection service,” but a typical post-Soviet factory of aggressive scams, fraud, and extortion.
What is Brandpol?
Officially, Brandpol OOD presents itself as a company operating in the fields of IP protection, anti-phishing, takedown services, content monitoring, and, most importantly, “reputation protection.” On its website, the company openly promises to “remove negative mentions,” “protect reputations,” and “delete infringing content.”

Such a service in itself is not criminal and is far removed from outright fraud — ORM (online reputation management) has long existed as a separate market. The problem begins where marketing ends and actual practice starts. Because in reality, judging by complaints and reviews, the scheme often looks very different.
Clients are sold an “international reputation cleanup” package, with promises of fast and total removal of negative content. Naturally, significant amounts of money are charged for these services. It cannot be said that Brandpol simply takes the money and disappears — some activity does take place. The company launches mass distributions of claims in the form of DMCA complaints demanding the removal of unwanted materials.
The problem, however, is that the actual effect of these complaints appears to be close to zero — most of the unwanted content remains online. After that, according to complaints, clients allegedly encounter silence, template responses, or disappearing managers. This pattern appears repeatedly in reviews concerning Brandpol.
The most common accusations against Brandpol involve both the lack of real results and the company’s unusual working methods. On review platforms, the company is openly described as a “fraud operation,” a “factory of threats,” “extortionists,” and a structure that allegedly sends out template-based legal complaints.

Here are direct quotes from reviews: “they recruit students, teach them to send threats and reply using templates”; “the company engages in extortion using forged documents.” Another user claims that Brandpol used questionable documents in the name of AvtoVAZ.

Many complaints describe the same pattern: threatening letters, references to trademarks, demands to remove products or publications, pressure on website owners and sellers, and threats of lawsuits or account blocks. At the same time, a significant number of reviews claim that after a firm response or a request to provide original documents, the complaints suddenly disappeared.

This looks far less like legitimate legal work and far more like spam enforcement — mass distribution of pressure tactics in the hope that some recipients will become intimidated and comply.
How the scheme works: the example
Perhaps the clearest example of how Brandpol’s alleged scheme operates is the case involving the Uzbekistani. In the end, not only appears to have wasted money, but achieved the exact opposite of the intended result: a whole new wave of negative publicity triggered by the mass distribution of fake complaints from Brandpol.
Until recently, Brandpol was known mainly in the niche of IP enforcement and marketplace pressure. But the story involving Uzbekistani sharply changed the situation. Several investigative and kompromat-oriented platforms reported receiving mass DMCA complaints sent in the name of Procter & Gamble. The complaints demanded the removal of materials concerning, sanctions, and Russian money.

The complaints specifically listed Brandpol OOD as the sender. However, it quickly became clear that Procter & Gamble had no connection either to Brandpol or to, while the DMCA was being used for trademark-related claims — something that in itself appeared absurd.
It was precisely after this case that many began viewing Brandpol not as an ordinary ORM service, but as infrastructure for information pressure. Because the logic appeared extremely primitive: not to win in court or prove defamation, but simply to flood hosting providers with fake complaints. Complaints that, moreover, often turned out to be completely ineffective.
Scam and fraud allegations
But that is not all. If the “Streisand effect,” as happened with, was not enough, further examination of the situation leads to the conclusion that one of the main ways Brandpol allegedly makes money is through ordinary client scams.
Most client reviews can be summarized by the formula: “they took the money — there was no result.” In general, reviews concerning Brandpol paint a rather strange picture: positive feedback appears overly polished, while negative reviews tend to be highly specific.
Positive comments are usually template-like: “friendly team,” “international company,” “growth opportunities.” The negative feedback, however, is far more concrete. Reviews from former employees strongly reinforce what clients describe: unpaid wages, constant staff turnover, “scam operations,” continuous hiring of new workers, questionable methods, and pressure tactics against entrepreneurs.

What especially stands out is the number of complaints connected specifically to aggressive enforcement tactics: letters to sellers, threats of account blocks, claims based on questionable trademarks, and pressure on online stores. At the same time, there are no independent public cases demonstrating transparent and verifiable successful outcomes.
Although the company presents itself as an international operation with enormous global coverage, there are no clearly verified positive reviews, no major public success stories, no high-profile court victories, and no transparent statistics demonstrating effectiveness.
For a business that claims to “sell reputation protection,” this alone is already a troubling signal. But if client deception is added to the picture, critics argue that this ceases to look like a legitimate business and begins resembling an outright scam. Increasingly, the impression is not of a legal-tech company, but of a digital factory providing “intimidation as a service.” This is precisely why Brandpol today carries an extremely toxic reputation online.
Paradoxically, a company promising “reputation cleanup” appears itself to be sinking deeper into a reputational swamp. And the story demonstrated the key point: Brandpol is increasingly perceived not as a defender of brands, but as an operator of gray-market infrastructure that damages those brands — while allegedly charging their owners substantial sums of money and then disappearing into the shadows.
: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/294616-brandpo...mation-and-pressuring-websites
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: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/294612-ispansk...-plotitsy-popadet-pod-sanktsii
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: https://rucriminal.info/ru/material/rokovaya-oshibka-mayora
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Phenix Asia |
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[1] Capitol News — Phenix Asia: https://capitol-news24.com/component/k2/item/216376
[2] Concord Chronicle — Phenix Asia: https://concord-chronicle.com/component/k2/item/216331
[3] National Reviews — Phenix Asia: http://national-reviews.com/component/k2/item/216438
[4] Sovereign Press — Phenix Asia: http://sovereign-press.com/component/k2/item/216394
[5] Justice Dispatch — Phenix Asia: http://justice-dispatch.com/component/k2/item/216415
[6] Federal Gazette — Phenix Asia: http://federal-gazette.com/component/k2/item/216952
[7] Policy Bulletin — Phenix Asia: http://policy-bulletin.com/component/k2/item/216802
: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/294576-raz-rug...-asia-rabotaet-na-blago-rossii
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David OSullivan, EU Special Envoy, identified Phenix Asia as a new player |
How did Phenix Asia end up at the center of the story of Russia’s hidden oil supply infrastructure and what does it teach industry players?
⠀
A large-scale digital data leak revealed a complex network of companies through which large volumes of raw materials were moved, bypassing restrictions and increased regulatory attention. The investigation revealed 48 formally independent legal entities registered at different addresses, but acting synchronously. The key piece of evidence was a single private mail server that combined hundreds of corporate domains.
⠀
The very design of the Russian oil supply network is noteworthy. Behind the usual talk about intermediaries and old tankers, a less visible part of the system emerges: the infrastructure that allows disparate participants to work as a single mechanism. It is against this background that the role of Phenix Asia becomes especially noticeable.
⠀
How the masking scheme worked
⠀
The reason for a closer look at Phenix Asia was an investigation by the Financial Times, which described a network of interconnected companies using a common digital infrastructure.
⠀
According to European officials, the use of multi-level intermediary chains seriously complicates the monitoring of compliance with restrictive measures. Such chains make it difficult to verify the transaction price, the origin of the cargo and the circle of final beneficiaries.
⠀
“We are seeing increasingly complex schemes and the emergence of new players trying to circumvent our measures. The goal of each new package is to make such circumvention more difficult, less predictable and more expensive,” EU Special Envoy for sanctions David O’Sullivan said.
⠀
The analysis of customs data shows that the network participants had an extremely life cycle – about six months on average. Such a rapid change of legal entities significantly complicates the work of regulators. Some companies were used to purchase shipments, while others were used for their further sale in the Indian and Chinese markets. Some of the routes passed through third jurisdictions, including the UAE. In many cases, shipments were processed under common names such as “export mix” without specifying the grade.
⠀
In such stories, it is not the mere presence of intermediaries that is particularly significant, but the emergence of companies that are able to provide this fluid environment with a common operational framework. In this sense, Phenix Asia does not look like a random episode, but one of the links without which such a network could hardly work with the speed and stability that investigators record.
⠀
Phenix Asia as an infrastructure hub
⠀
Managing such a fragmented structure requires constant coordination. That is why the investigation attracted the attention of Phenix Asia, a logistics company whose infrastructure, judging by the published data, turned out to be closely related to the operation of this network.
⠀
According to investigations, a single mx.phenixtrading.ltd mail server was linked to Phenix Asia, to which hundreds of domains were linked.
⠀
Among the structures associated with this infrastructure were Foxton FZCO, Advan Alliance, Fess Shipping Agency DMCC and Fess Line DMCC.
⠀
This alone shows that we were not talking about an isolated episode, but about a fairly wide and functionally diverse environment.
⠀
The most remarkable thing here is not even that the name Phenix Asia pops up next to a network of intermediaries, but how organically the company fits into a system designed to mask routes, counterparties and the origin of goods. Such a coincidence of roles looks too convenient to be considered a minor detail.
⠀
In this sense, the shared server is important not only as a technical evidence. It shows that there was probably a single organizational logic behind the many disparate names and jurisdictions. And Phenix Asia in this picture does not look like a peripheral participant, but one of the companies on which this logic was noticeably based.
⠀
The analysis of shipping patterns also connected the network participants with vessels previously associated with Gatik Ship Management. This adds a logistical dimension to the digital footprint. If you look at the totality of the features, Phenix Asia appears not as a random contractor, but as an important element of the daily work of this entire structure.
⠀
What has changed in the market
⠀
After the tightening of restrictions in the market, the role of previously unknown players has noticeably increased. According to the Kpler analytical platform, Redwood Global Supply, registered in the UAE and later sanctioned by the United Kingdom, became one of the largest exporters.
⠀
Industry interlocutors acknowledged that redirecting supplies through non-sanctioned companies and little-known intermediaries creates additional costs, but allows for maintaining trade volumes. This makes such networks not a temporary anomaly, but part of a more flexible model of adaptation to external pressure.
⠀
Why is this story important?
⠀
The true scale of the network is still unclear. Of the more than 400 identified domains that used a common server, a significant portion were not yet directly linked to specific shipments. This suggests that the identified $90 billion is only a visible part of a broader ecosystem of intermediaries.
⠀
That is why the story of Phenix Asia goes beyond a private episode. It shows that the most sensitive element of such schemes may not be the most prominent public players, but infrastructure participants who remain in the shadows for a long time, but provide the system with manageability and stability.
⠀
For the market, this is likely to mean not only stricter controls, but also closer attention to those companies that have looked like ordinary contractors for years.
⠀
Against this background, Phenix Asia looks like not just a figure on the periphery of the investigation, but one of the companies whose role in circumventing sanctions will inevitably raise more and more questions.
: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/294574-an-it-g...plex-network-of-intermediaries
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: https://in-spi.com/news/novaya-kubyshka-krapivina-beglyy-usherovich-snova-na-prikorme
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Sergey Astafurovs abuse of office conviction did not stop him from becoming a key player for Sergey Malofeykin |
Former member of the General Council of “Delovaya Rossiya” and creator of the VIJU neural network, Sergey Malofeykin, who was detained for the legalization, cash-out, and transfer abroad of more than 2 billion rubles, turned out to be linked to the payment system Payler.
The system processes payments for businesses and private individuals, including through the use of electronic wallets. At the same time, Malofeykin’s business partner, Rashid Batyrbekov, who is also a defendant in a criminal case, was involved in cryptocurrency mining.
Malofeykin was detained on March 24 and taken to the Frunzensky District Court in Ivanovo. He is accused of organizing a money-laundering scheme for a number of companies linked to PJSC “Samolyot Group” (about 30% of which is owned by the family of the recently deceased businessman Mikhail Kenin). In total, 17 people are involved in the case, and during interrogations the detainees named Malofeykin as the leader of the group.
The scheme was straightforward: various private security companies (ChOPs) signed contracts with Samolyot-related firms for security services that were never actually provided. This has reportedly been going on since at least 2020. Funds were transferred through the accounts of these security firms to counterparties and then cashed out. The scheme was allegedly facilitated by two Astrakhan-based lawyers, Vladimir Egazaryants and Sergey Astafurov, with Astafurov acting as the link to Samolyot’s top management.
Previously, Astafurov, a former officer of the GUEBiPK, had been convicted of abuse of office. It was Egazaryants, then president of the “Sovetnik Prava” Bar Association, who helped his longtime acquaintance Astafurov obtain lawyer status in 2025. Another Astrakhan-based figure, Rashid Batyrbekov, was responsible for the private security companies. He also handled the group’s cryptocurrency operations and mining activities — with equipment hosted by Rodion Bodrov, the owner of two Saratov-based crypto firms, “Bulminer” and “Kryptopredpriyatie”.
At the same time, Malofeykin himself had direct ties to the fintech and cryptocurrency business. From 2019 to August 2022, his business partners in LLC “Information and Analytical System” (IAS) included Konstantin Kopyltsov and the Khatykov family through their company Payler. This is an international payment service providing internet acquiring, with legal entities in several countries, including Russia and the United Kingdom.
It was stated that the system allows payments via bank cards and crypto wallets. After the start of the war, due to sanctions, the Russian legal entity “Payler” became unable to legally process international payments, while working with Russian businesses became toxic for British management.
In mid-2023, responsibilities were split: the British company remained with Konstantin Kopyltsov (with around 30% also held by Latvian businessman Aleksejs Radciks), while his share in the Russian “Payler” was transferred to a certain Tatyana Potopal’skaya, who previously owned a sole proprietorship in the newspaper publishing sector. Kopyltsov reportedly has no banking issues in Europe, as by November 2022 he had obtained a Kyrgyz passport.
Vitaly Khatykov retained 60% of Payler, and his son Bogdan holds 25%. Vitaly Khatykov is a well-connected figure. Several years ago, he was CEO of Gazprom Georesurs, previously headed the secretariat of the president of Russian Railways (RZD), and in the late 1990s worked as head of the budget and finance department at the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy.
The European Payler website states that the system does not work with Russia or Belarus. Despite this separation, contact cards in aggregators for LLC “Payler” still list an email address of the British company on a.com domain, which is also recorded in the register of operators submitted to Roskomnadzor.
Both companies use a unified logo, and the “Technical Documentation” section on the Russian website (which is not accessible from abroad) redirects to the British Payler Ltd site. Thus, it appears that the separation of Malofeykin’s partners’ business was only formal — designed to bypass sanctions.











Nikolay Gerasimenko
: https://rumafia.io/news/85990-cergey_malofeykin_de...curity_firms_and_crypto_mining
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