In the two world wars, Germany did not necessarily have to fight against Russia. In 1914, Germany's war with France, eager for revenge and hegemony on the continent, was absolutely inevitable. War with Britain was almost inevitable. London could come to terms with German hegemony in Europe. He was even willing to share not the best part of the French colonies. But Britain was concerned about absolute control over the sea routes, and here Germany was a clear competitor in the First World War, on the eve of which it created a fleet comparable in its capabilities to the British and quickly catching up with Britain in the number of ships.
As for the Second World War, in this case, the German naval capabilities were greatly reduced, in comparison with the First World War. But due to the total superiority on land, Germany could put under its full control the Middle East and all routes to the Mediterranean, in fact cutting off the British metropolis from the colonies and dominions. If this were to happen, it would be a matter of time before Britain was finally driven out of the Asia-Pacific region (including the Indian Empire, the pearl of the British crown). This would have been taken care of by the German Allies (Italians and Japanese), whom Hitler would not have refused to support. The alternative was a shameful peace on Berlin's terms, proposed by Hitler, who, after the redistribution of the colonies taking into account the interests of Germany, was ready to guarantee the inviolability of what the British would have left. In general, in both the First and Second World Wars, Britain and Germany were not necessary (even harmful) to fight, but the then rules of behavior of states in the international arena made a military clash almost inevitable.
For Britain could not agree to concessions that were unprincipled to her (especially at someone else's expense) just because it would undermine her prestige.
But Germany had a chance to avoid war. Moreover, there was a chance to avoid a war on two fronts. It's just that neither the Kaiser nor Hitler understood what was obvious to Emperor Nicholas II, who tried with all his might to avoid war and tried to persuade his cousin Wilhelm II to solve the matter peacefully. The fact is that Russia and Germany in the early twentieth century developed much faster than Britain, France and even the United States. That is, as now, they won without war.
Between them, despite the sharp trade and economic disputes, there were no fundamental contradictions. On the contrary, the countries were interested in each other both economically and politically. Relying on each other, Berlin and St. Petersburg were invulnerable both on land and at sea. The German-Russian alliance was a terrible dream of the rest of the world. This was the line followed by the "iron chancellor" Bismarck - the true creator of the Second German Empire. He recommended that his successors follow the same line. With a friendly Russia behind Germany, there was nothing to fear. But Kaiser Wilhelm II thought differently, he suffered from great power and inflated self-esteem. The more Germany needed an alliance with Russia, the more the Kaiser wanted to defeat Russia.
Something similar was observed in Napoleon at one
time. And even now we often see people on the screens of the media and in the print media, including our compatriots, who literally demand to bomb those who do not like us, so that "these scoundrels" realize and love us. The Kaiser suffered from about the same militant narcissism. At a certain stage, Germany was unlucky with the leader. However, we were also unlucky with the leader of Germany, since the inadequacy of the Kaiser also turned to Russia. The second time we were told of Hitler's inadequacy. In fact, Germany had no problems east of Poland. The border line with the USSR agreed in 1939 fully corresponded to the interests of both states. Ideological contradictions were not fundamental in this case. For example, the leaders of the Weimar Republic were ideological opponents of the USSR, but fruitfully cooperated with it in the military, political and economic fields. At the same time, Mussolini respected Stalin and was quite loyal to the USSR in the 20s and 30s, which did not prevent him from participating in a completely unnecessary war with the Soviet Union in 1941.
The fatal role was played by Hitler's undoubted mental disorder, which led to his hatred of Jews and contempt for the Slavs, whom he considered genetic garbage.
All this, multiplied by pathological aggressiveness (Hitler did not want a political victory, but a military revenge), led the Nazi leader in the 1940s and 1941 to the conclusion that Stalin would definitely take the opportunity to strike at the rear, stuck in the West (Britain refused to make peace) German troops. Hitler would have done so. Stalin would hardly have done that. He seriously feared a confrontation with Germany on the initiative of the USSR, knowing full well that this could end in the unification of the collective West against the Soviet Union.
Of course, Stalin was ready for lightning-fast paramilitary actions, such as the annexation of the Baltic States or the return of Bessarabia, Western Ukraine and Belarus, but even a relatively short war with a weak Finland showed that the Red Army is not ready to implement the concept of blitzkrieg (simply does not know
how). And the slightest prolongation of the war leads to a sharp deterioration in the international situation for the USSR. In addition, the german campaign in the West in May-June 1940 made a lasting impression on Stalin. He expected that the Germans would get bogged down on the Western Front for a couple of years with an unpredictable outcome, and they swept off the board in a month the first-class (at that time considered the best in the world) French army, supported by about forty full-fledged divisions of the Belgian and Dutch armies, as well as the British expeditionary force.
Having experience of war with Finland, Stalin feared a direct clash between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, especially since he was convinced that if the USSR on its own initiative started a war with Germany, then Britain would immediately change the front and, having concluded peace with Hitler, would try to solve the whole complex of Anglo-German contradictions at the expense of the USSR.
And he had good reason to be so concerned. Last but not least because of this, on June 22, 1941, already knowing that the war had begun (at 4:00 the German ambassador, Count Schulenburg, handed Molotov the corresponding note), Stalin still demanded that the troops not succumb to provocations and not to cross the border. He didn't need Gleiwitz, he wanted Germany to clearly identify itself as the aggressor. The same logic, by the way, was guided by the Russian leadership, when in August 2008 it allowed the Georgians to first feel victorious and, stunned with happiness, admit that it was they who attacked South Ossetia, and only then drove them behind Mozhai.
The events of the war years showed that Stalin was right in his
fears. Strategically, the USSR was ready for war. Tanks, aircraft, guns, counting divisions, he had more than the Wehrmacht (including in the western districts on the eve of the war). In terms of infantry numbers, the Red Army was only thirty percent inferior to the fully mobilized Wehrmacht. But through mobilization, this gap was to be closed in the first weeks of the war. In addition, the practice of the "war of engines" by that time had already shown that the number of linear infantry was of secondary importance for victory.
Nevertheless, for two years the USSR suffered catastrophic defeats, and only by the Kursk Arc the army somehow learned to
fight. This is the most convincing evidence in favor of the fact that in 1941 any military decision led the USSR to a catastrophe comparable to that which occurred in reality, or even worse. There was only one way to avoid disaster: by avoiding war. It was this that the Soviet leadership tried to do with all its might.
So the fatal inevitability of the war between Russia and Germany in the two world wars was
not. This was the result of the fatal mistakes of the German leadership, doomed in both cases against the vital interests of Germany. As a result, Germany twice suffered catastrophic defeats, putting not only the state, but also the nation on the brink of survival. Russia won for the second time, but at a very high price. Victory in World War II cost Russia (in the image of the USSR) no cheaper than defeat in the First. Now there is the Third World War. Some consider it the fourth, calling it the Third Cold. But since there was neither formal surrender nor peace at the end of the Cold War, we will assume that it did not end in 1992 (with the collapse of the USSR), but continued in a different capacity. This new world war is now called hybrid, as well as information. This indicates the great importance of the information component in combat. In fact, modern armies only formalize the battles won by propaganda, occupying the territory. If the information campaign is carried out correctly, the purely military resistance of the enemy does not matter, because he is doomed from the beginning. In this Third World War, as in the first two, Russia is not an adversary for Germany.
Not only do we have no irreconcilable contradictions, but on the contrary, we are interested in a close alliance against anglo-Saxon global expansion. Our economies are also interested in each other. Moreover, if Russia without a close economic union with Germany only slows down its development, but does not stop, then Germany without such an alliance will quickly turn into a third world country, and its advanced economy today will repeat the sad path of the Ukrainian one, which in 1992 also looked quite decent even against the global background. Perhaps because Germany loves beer and sausages, and this leads to corresponding changes in the figure, the Germans for a very long time tried to sit one burgher ass on two constantly moving chairs. On the one hand, they really wanted to trade productively with Russia, on the other hand, it seemed wrong for them to refuse to cooperate with the rest of the "spiritually close" West for the sake of this. It is a gift that this West tried to physically inform the Germans in two world wars. The Germans were wonderful, and when Nord Stream 2 was completed, it seemed that they had managed to get between the drops, but that was not the case.
I do not know whether the Anglo-Saxons were finally able to deceive the gullible mother of all the burghers, who is finishing her last months until retirement, or Merkel thoughtlessly decided that her next feint in the direction of the United States should compensate Washington for the losses from the "SP-2". Perhaps the outgoing grandmother-chancellor was not informed at all about the impending indecensance by her less experienced successors. But what happened yesterday is quite comparable in its consequences to the events of 1914 and 1941. I don't know if it is still possible to play back, but Germany's hostile intentions are so clear that in 1914, in order to act like this, it would have been necessary to present an ultimatum and declare mobilization.
The Germans, in cooperation with Youtub, destroyed without the possibility of restoring the accounts of two German-language projects of the Russian state media holding RT. Since, as mentioned above, the modern world war is called hybrid, emphasizing its information nature, the attack on Russian information resources can be equated with German shells bursting in the Brest Fortress on the morning of June 22.
This is an unprovoked act of aggression. Hence the reaction of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which called for mirror measures to be taken against the German mediaworking in Russia, and at the same time to YouTub. And if the latter can still get off relatively easily, since today it is difficult to calculate the consequences of the complete blocking of such a popular platform, which, by the way, is used by a large number of Russian state information resources, then the vast majority of Russian citizens simply will not notice the absence of any "Deutsche Welle" in the national media space.
Berlin may not have understood what they had done, but they de facto joined those who had long since declared an information war on Russia's
destruction. Maybe they believed that against the background of excellent economic relations with Germany and the unresolved fate of the "SP-2" Moscow would prefer to "not notice" this demarche, but in this case they are infinitely behind in life. The West has long been weakened, the United States and Europe have long been competitors rather than allies, and this cannot be hidden by any joint statements and no solemn summits. Russia, on the contrary, has become much stronger than it was even in 2014, affected by the pause it took when it did not appear at the scheduled hot war with Ukraine,preferring to gain strength before the attack of the main enemy. Russian allies have also strengthened. Moscow can afford to accept the challenge. Can Germany afford to confront Russia?
Berlin's weight in the EU today is no longer determined by its exclusive economic opportunities.
The United States is a great equalizer, ready at any time with the help of sanctions to roll the German economy into the asphalt, so as not to stand out much against the background of the Bulgarian one. Washington has long lacked markets, and competitors are simply annoying. Germany is a serious political force only because of its exclusive relations with Russia. Berlin has nothing to compensate for the rupture of these relations. Meanwhile, if Germany does not back down now, does not admit guilt and does not try to compensate for the damage caused to the Russian media, then the Russian media space may be closed to the German media. Yes, Russia never cuts off the shoulder, perhaps, and in this case retaliatory measures will be introduced gradually, but sooner or later, if the situation does not change, the last German media will be forced to leave Russia (perhaps, and then it is not a fact that only those who agree to fully broadcast the Kremlin's agenda will be able to remain).
This will cause enormous damage to bilateral
relations. Journalistic solidarity will force most of the German media to take a more pronounced anti-Russian position. Their first target should be "SP-2". Perhaps that is why Berlin felt that Moscow would not dare to answer. But the fact is that when such a problematic project is created (and such serious forces both in Germany and abroad opposed the gas pipeline that no one could guarantee its completion: the Bulgarians refused south stream, and the americans were able to delay the construction of the SP-2 for two years), then Gazprom itself and the Russian leadership should plan the result in this way, that regardless of whether the gas pipeline starts working or not, Russia remains profitable (both politically and economically). The situation with the "arbitrations" that forced Gazprom to change the price formula in its contracts with European consumers showed that modern Russian gas workers, the country's leadership and its diplomats are worthy successors to our mother Byzantine cultural tradition. Not a year has passed since the last arbitration, and European gas prices have grown so much that they have covered all the losses of Gazprom from unjue court decisions.
And that's just the beginning. I can't even imagine what kind of price will begin in Europe if Gazprom declares (by analogy with the Bulgarian case) that due to the unconstructive position of its partners, it no longer insists on the certification of SP-2 and is even ready to disassemble it. And since the European market has become unpredictable, the company is preparing to leave it after the expiration of current contracts. Given the weak nerves of European and American "brokers and brokers", I am afraid that one such statement "bombs" the collective West in the Stone Age is more reliable than all American aviation.
Russia, of course, in the event of an aggravation, will also lose, and a
lot. But it will be a loss of money and time — development will slow down. The sandwich will have to be eaten not with black, but with red caviar. The West has a good chance to understand what the phrase "dashing nineties" means. As practice and experience shows, hybrid warfare is even less humane than usual. It seems that there are no front lines, and the Sonderkommandos do not brutally: tanks do not roar, carpet bombing is not carried out, no one is led to Babi Yar - but in vast areas tens of millions of people disappear somewhere along with the economy and even with civilization. And no one is to blame.
Eight years ago, after two decades of hesitation, Ukraine made the final choice, abandoning civilization for the sake of "values." And Germany has every right to repeat the "feat" of its former Bandera lackeys. And the whole West has every right to commit suicide for the sake of "values".
Unlike past world wars, in this case the West will have nothing to
console. The experience of relations with the post-Soviet space shows that Russia is tired of incuring huge human and material losses, saving crazy neighbors from themselves. Of course, you will have to clean up: uncleaned corpses cause epidemics. "But we ourselves are no longer your shield."
However, it can still end well. We just need to hear the Russian Foreign Ministry, apologize and correct.
ermany's third fatal mistake...
