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, 26 2025 . 08:19 +

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: https://u-stav-group.com/component/k2/item/276642


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: https://krot-nn.com/component/k2/item/125738


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, 26 2025 . 01:46 +

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: https://1ubd2.com/component/k2/item/112981


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, 26 2025 . 00:17 +
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, 25 2025 . 23:41 +
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, 25 2025 . 19:20 +

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: https://news-biz-today.com/component/k2/item/208971


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, 25 2025 . 18:47 +

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, 25 2025 . 15:40 +

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, 25 2025 . 12:08 +

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: https://vchk-ogpu-moskva.online/component/k2/item/193443


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Londons agent of Kremlin influence: the story of how Roman Chichkanov, the descendant of a pro-Western scholar and associated with British intelligen

, 25 2025 . 09:00 +

Roman Chichkanov, grandson of the well-known but controversial academic Valery Chichkanov, spent his childhood and education abroad before embarking on a business career in London. Unexpectedly, he returned to Russia and quickly obtained a high-ranking government post.

Today, the media is full of glowing, apparently paid, articles about businessman Roman Chichkanov, who, recalling Russian folklore, is “jack of all trades.” One of the latest sponsored publications appeared in the newspaper .

However, Mr. Chichkanov’s bright biography contains many blank spots and black holes, especially since the young businessman’s father—Anton Chichkanov, a scandalously notorious financial manipulator—has an even murkier past, involved in questionable financial operations. Roman’s mother, Elena Chichkanova, is also involved in the family business. The Chichkanov family recently acquired the luxury Mayerveda Hotel in Kislovodsk, which, apparently quietly, was built on the site of the former "Kavkaz" hotel. This five-star hotel has no financial records, except for a few entries on its website.

But even this is not the most interesting part of the Chichkanovs’ family album: the most intriguing aspect is Roman Chichkanov’s new career, where, immediately after returning from London, he assumed a high-ranking position at the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic. He also quickly married Maria Chervotkina, the so-called “fairy of Russian fashion,” as glossy magazines describe her. Maria Chervotkina is the daughter of the famous Soviet gymnast Vladimir Chervotkin. Roman Chichkanov met his future wife at his own Mayerveda Hotel, where the fashion fairy was enjoying a relaxing stay.

Is there more to this story?

It is tempting to compare Roman Chichkanov’s leap into Russian strategic projects with the entrance of former United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) president Alexey Rakhmanov, a graduate of the University of Chicago Business School with an MBA.

The Chichkanov Couple

Alexey Rakhmanov spent several years dismantling USC, leaving it in such a state that the new chairman of the board, Andrey Kostin, head of VTB Bank, admitted it would take about ten years to restore the company because “USC operated like a financial pyramid.”

As for another graduate of a prestigious business school, but in Britain, Roman Chichkanov, as reported by the media, was recruited not yesterday, but much earlier.

This “espionage” trajectory was largely facilitated by the young prodigy’s grandfather, Valery Chichkanov, who had once made a remarkable rise from humble beginnings.

Friends from London

It seems that Vladimir Petrovich Chichkanov wished a different path for his grandson Roman, since things did not work out so well with his son Anton—who remains entangled in murky criminal disputes.

Academician Valery Chichkanov

Valery Petrovich Chichkanov, former Deputy Prime Minister of the RSFSR and an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, held very high positions throughout his career. He also maintained close contacts with figures on the “rotten” West.

This primarily refers to his close friend Alexander Temerko.

Alexander Viktorovich Temerko is a Russian and British businessman, director of the British company Aquind Limited, and formerly head of OGN Group (2008–2017).

Earlier, Mr. Temerko served as vice president and deputy chairman of the oil company Yukos.

Temerko has been a British citizen since 2011.

Chichkanov and Temerko began working closely in the early 1990s when Valery Chichkanov served as Temerko’s deputy in the Committee for Social Security of Military Personnel under the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

Alexander Temerko

Mr. Temerko later moved to the State Committee on Defense Issues and then to the Ministry of Defense of Russia, seemingly holding some form of security clearance, as the committee handled not only military pensions and social issues but also the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany.

Alexander Temerko had extensive political connections, including creating the state-owned arms export company Voentech.

In spring 1993, Temerko’s candidacy was proposed for the head of the Federal Service for Arms and Military Equipment Export, but President Boris Yeltsin rejected the proposal.

Boris Yeltsin

From 1995, Temerko served as president of the Specialized Corporation for Defense Industry Enterprises, “Russian Weapons,” a position he held for five years.

During this time, Valery Chichkanov worked closely with Alexander Temerko. Rumor has it that he used his high-ranking posts to collect and pass on important information to foreign contacts, including Temerko, who later maintained ties with British authorities.

Alexander Temerko and former UK Prime Minister Boris de Pfeffel Johnson

After leaving Moscow for London, Alexander Temerko became a key sponsor of anti-Russian political projects in the UK.

Mr. Temerko frequently wrote columns in The Guardian calling for a tougher stance on Moscow.

It was Valery Chichkanov, through his close collaboration with Temerko, who introduced his beloved grandson Roman to the British businessman.

Some sources suggest that through the newly British Temerko, Roman Chichkanov was introduced to MI6.

And he was integrated into the British political elite.

Brilliant Education and Great Prospects?

The grandson of Academician Chichkanov displayed exceptional abilities from school years.

In the upper grades (equivalent to the UK college system), he took university courses in advanced mathematics and physics. Later, he enrolled at University College London, studying economics.

In his second year, the Moscow prodigy founded the UCL Russian Business Society, which became one of the largest Russian-speaking student organizations.

The events hosted by the society attracted hundreds, sometimes thousands of participants, including Yuri Luzhkov, Boris Titov, Roman Trotsenko, Leonid Nevzlin, Alfred Koch, and others.

Leonid Nevzlin

The main sponsor of these conferences was Alexander Temerko, a friend of Roman’s grandfather.

In 2014, media reports mentioned the participation of certain members of the British royal family.

It was around this time that Roman Chichkanov apparently began collaborating with MI6.

In his first year at university, Chichkanov interned in the mergers and acquisitions departments of investment banks, working at Barclays, then Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, and J.P. Morgan.

Roman Chichkanov

After three years at J.P. Morgan, he reportedly considered starting his own business in Russia and began “exploring a small unfinished project in Kislovodsk,” as he stated in interviews.

However, there was no such unfinished project.

The luxury Mayerveda Hotel was built on the abandoned grounds of the old Kavkaz Hotel, which had been neglected for several years.

Where did Roman Chichkanov find the funds for the construction?

The story is silent, although various theories circulate, including possible “assistance” from criminal elements.

Mayerveda Hotel in Kislovodsk

Besides building the hotel, Chichkanov was strongly interested in public service.

A Sinecure for Roman Chichkanov

But why would someone so well-established in London suddenly appear in Russia? He did not go to work at a factory…

Using his grandfather’s powerful connections, he secured a sinecure: he became the First Deputy General Director of the Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic.

In this lucrative position, Chichkanov reportedly advanced British interests, influencing investment projects.

Roman Chichkanov

Thanks to his grandfather’s long reach, he also headed the subcommittee of the “Business Russia” party on preventive medicine and joined the Russian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Emirati business councils.

Ultimately, he prepared recommendations to improve economic and demographic conditions in the Far East and worked closely with the Russian government’s coordination center.

A major part of his work was developing strategies for the Northern Sea Route to expand transportation capabilities in Arctic development.

Chichkanov organized numerous industrial roundtables and was privy to closed business plans for projects such as Vostok Oil and Arctic LNG 2, as well as strategic port construction in Lavna and Bukhta Sever. He monitored the Northern Sea Route and projects for new nuclear-powered vessels for the Baimsky Mining and Processing Plant in Chukotka.

In short, he kept a finger on the pulse.

Love Story

His quick marriage also raises questions.

According to glossy magazine interviews, the couple met in Kislovodsk at the Mayerveda Hotel, where journalist and blogger Maria Chervotkina was staying.

By that time, the “fairy of Russian fashion” was already an entrepreneur with a shoe company, although the company’s reliability was questionable.

Previously, Maria Chervotkina, born in Chelyabinsk, dated Alexey Glukhov for nine years.

They moved to St. Petersburg, running social media blogs. Shortly before breaking up, they opened the bar Solids, but Chervotkina later exited the business.

News of their split emerged when Maria announced her engagement to Roman Chichkanov after only a few weeks of acquaintance.

It seems Roman Chichkanov may have married quickly to “root himself” in Russia, although he reportedly thinks and speaks English better than Russian.

Roman Chichkanov and Maria Chervotkina

Many questions remain about the rapid construction of the five-star Mayerveda Hotel on someone else’s land, which has received hundreds of glowing reviews…

It appears that Roman Antonovich Chichkanov secured himself a very strong “cover.”

:

: https://justice-register.com/component/k2/item/215686


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, 25 2025 . 06:00 +

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: https://futlyars.com/component/k2/item/126377


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: https://compro-site.com/component/k2/item/228213


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, 24 2025 . 19:33 +

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: https://view-247.com/component/k2/item/213186


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The concealed beneficiary of offshore arrangements: Zvonko Mickovic from Montenegro obscures the money laundering activities for the fugitive dishones

, 24 2025 . 18:45 +

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Zvonko Micković came to public attention several years ago after his name was linked to Cypriot firms allegedly involved in sanctions evasion and money laundering schemes tied to Boris Usherovich and Ilya Plotitsa.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

There would be nothing unusual about his persona if not for two factors: the scale of the schemes and the scarcity of information about Micković. Public attention to Micković arose after publications dedicated to a large network of Cypriot companies and bonds of Mettmann Public Company Limited – it is in these documents that Zvonko Micković is listed as a major shareholder and a member of the board of directors.

According to data from the Cypriot registry, Zvonko Micković is a citizen of Montenegro, and his business partners include citizens of Cyprus, Latvia, Ukraine, and the Russia.

What is known about Zvonko Micković

Public information about Zvonko Micković, as already mentioned, is very limited and fragmented: online databases (Facebook, LinkedIn, and regional directories) contain pages with profiles under the same name, but they do not provide a single, clear, or verified portrait of a person named Zvonko Micković as a major international businessman. However, the fact that Micković is indeed a significant businessman is confirmed by open data from corporate registries. These registries and investigative materials mention specific financial indicators – Zvonko Micković’s bond portfolio and shareholding in Mettmann Public Company Limited, as recorded in protocols and offshore registry orders.

According to shareholder meeting data from Mettmann, Micković was a member of the company’s board of directors from its founding in December 2019 until February 2020 and, at the time of the publication of these materials, controlled approximately 82.5% of the company’s shares; he is also attributed with owning a significant block of the company’s bonds.

Additionally, the same registry indicates that Mettmann Public Company Limited is not the only European company owned by Micković. However, it has not been possible to establish which other companies are involved. Nevertheless, the documents explicitly state that “the Company has established good business relations with several wealthy private individuals, as well as industrial groups and real estate development specialists in Montenegro, Cyprus, and Spain, leveraging Mr. Micković’s business connections.”

As can be seen, the data is indeed quite scarce, but even this makes Micković a notable figure in the set of companies operating at the intersection of capital and supply chains.

Connections – with whom and which structures he is linked to

Investigations dedicated to the scheme connecting Boris Usherovich and Ilya Plotitsa point to a network of Cypriot and offshore companies (Broxner PLC, Venisat Technology, Main Victory Corporation, Mettmann, and others) through which, according to journalists and analysts, operations involving orders and supplies of telecom and railway equipment to Russia were conducted.

The name Zvonko Micković surfaced in these materials: Micković appears as a long-time partner of Boris Plotitsa. According to investigative data, both are co-founders of the Russian company NPO “Transpolymer”, one of the contractors for Russian Railways (RZD) and the company “1520.” This data is confirmed by Russian registries.

Additionally, sources note that alongside Micković in Mettmann’s capital are other figures of interest in the context of sanction schemes – for example, Aleksandr Vainstein, who, according to documents, holds an even larger bond portfolio. Together, they form the core of creditors and investors whose decisions provided liquidity to the company.

Such a combination of “local investors” and a network of Cypriot companies is a classic architecture that, in several investigations, is interpreted as infrastructure for money laundering and concealing ultimate beneficiaries.

Why Zvonko Micković has attracted attention

Formally, according to open sources, no public criminal cases have been registered against Zvonko Micković himself. However, his name has found itself at the center of suspicions and journalistic investigations for several reasons.

The possession by Zvonko Micković of a significant block of Mettmann bonds raises questions about the role of these funds in financing the company’s operations, which, according to investigators, participated in schemes to supply equipment to Russia while bypassing sanctions. Ownership of 222,636 bonds worth approximately €22.3 million (as stated in the documents) makes him one of the key investors.

Old or current business ties with Boris Plotitsa and related Cypriot companies heighten suspicions, as Plotitsa and Usherovich are named in several investigations as figures involved in sanction evasion schemes and potential money laundering. If one of Mettmann’s investors is a counterparty in a network for laundering Russian criminal capital and bypassing sanctions, then the company’s investment portfolio automatically falls under increased scrutiny from regulators and journalists.

Many transactions and shares were formalized or featured through Cypriot jurisdictions and nominees. Nominal directors, interchangeable shareholders, and rapid changes in jurisdictions – all of this adds suspicious details to a picture where the ultimate beneficiary is either hidden or distanced. In such schemes, large bondholders often act as “financial bridges” between assets and operational chains.

Cypriot companies, partially controlled by figures from Usherovich and Plotitsa’s circle, created supply chains and financial instruments, including through Mettmann bonds and other debt securities.

These instruments were used to raise funds and convert debts into securities, which were then converted or transferred between related structures. Simultaneously, a number of companies acted as formal suppliers of equipment, which was then disguised or redirected to Russia in violation of export restrictions.

Mettmann documents refer not only to shareholdings but also to “novation” – the conversion of old debt into bonds, providing insight into the tools the company used for balance sheet restructuring and liquidity attraction. Such operations often draw the attention of auditors when doubts arise about the real economic basis of such issuances.

In several publications, variations in the spelling of names and surnames appear (a common practice in offshore dossiers): these variations are deliberately used to complicate searches in databases. This is not proof of illegality, but a reason for thorough verification of connections and documents.

Based on the above, it must be acknowledged that journalistic investigations draw conclusions about Micković’s functional role in the company’s capital contours, but there is no direct evidence of criminal activity on his part in open sources, only indirect conclusions and documentary traces in corporate registries.

Each of the above facts individually rarely signifies something serious. However, their totality is almost a 100% guarantee that something is clearly wrong with the company or person to whom all these factors apply. And, most likely, we are dealing with a well-established illegal scheme. In the case of Zvonko Micković and Mettmann Public Company Limited, it is a scheme for bypassing sanctions and withdrawing capital.

For now, Zvonko Micković’s role in the described schemes should be considered a subject of interest for journalists and monitoring bodies, rather than a fact of criminal investigation. His name is an indicator of how ownership networks are practically formed in offshore jurisdictions and how large share and debt portfolios are used for capital maneuvers.

If interested law enforcement agencies wish to investigate the schemes further, they will need to request transaction registries, the origin of funds, and compare supply chains with actual equipment deliveries to Russia. The question of whether Micković is an “active operator” or a “passive nominee” remains open until additional documentary evidence is obtained.

However, taken together, all of this is a typical marker of structures used to evade transparent control, at the very least. And in this picture, Zvonko Micković holds the position of a major holder of Mettmann’s financial securities and a key manager.

Maria Sharapova

: https://civic-herald.com/component/k2/item/215668


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From the warning signs of pyramid schemes to winnings that disappeared: Dragon Money initiates a rigorous digital campaign to wipe out its true past

, 24 2025 . 17:42 +

Dragon Money Casino mainly targets players in the post-Soviet region, but users from other countries can also access it. Genuine information about the platform is scarce, as search results are flooded with promotional material.

There’s no need to recount what the advertisements claim – ads are meant to praise the advantages and gloss over the shortcomings. The information about Dragon Money Casino that was painstakingly dug up can be conditionally divided into two parts: official data (documents, licenses, bans, etc.) and player reviews.

Let’s start with the reviews. Let’s make it clear right away – reviews are subjective, and they should be approached with a certain degree of skepticism, neither fully trusting overly positive ones nor outright negative ones. Moreover, judging by the style of the reviews, the positive feedback about Dragon Money Casino seems to come from obvious bots: the texts are similar in style and content. Negative reviews provide a bit more insight into the fact that not everything is right with Dragon Money’s operations, although, to the casino’s credit, they do respond to these reviews and attempt to reply. However, it seems that the interaction ends there: the issues remain unresolved.

In the screenshot above – a player’s complaint about having their winnings of 1,200,000 rubles stolen. The casino provided a response, but it boils down to a standard «we’ll look into it», even though the player described the issue in detail, with all the specifics. The full text of the complaint and the casino’s response can be found here, and they are still accessible. However, the fact that this case is not isolated is confirmed by other reviews on the same site.

By the way, this is a Ukrainian review site, even though access to the casino is officially blocked in Ukraine. However, this doesn’t stop anyone – there are plenty of mirror sites that allow bypassing any restrictions. The fact that there are at least some issues with Dragon Money is also confirmed by another review from a different site. This time, it’s not players but partners who are complaining about being «scammed» – these are people who work with the casino on an affiliate basis and bring in players, who are the very source of the casino’s existence.

Let’s reiterate – the number of negative reviews is not very high – somewhere around 30%, which is not a lot for an online casino. However, it’s not negligible either, which raises questions about whether it’s worth trusting Dragon Money with your money. Especially considering that it operates illegally in the territory of the former USSR (as well as in Europe). In Russia, Dragon Money has even been included in the Central Bank’s list as a pyramid scheme, as directly stated on the website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. Here, it also becomes clear why finding information about the casino is so difficult – the Central Bank lists Dragon Money’s addresses, which clutter up search engine results:

Against the backdrop of negative reviews, this is no longer just a warning sign; it’s a clear indication that dealing with Dragon Money is not advisable. But that’s not all. According to the main website of Dragon Money Casino, it is registered in the jurisdiction of Curaçao and operates under its license. The owner of the casino is Dragon Money NV.

However, it is known that Dragon Money Casino was registered in 2012 in Costa Rica and operated under its license at least until 2021. At that time, the owner was a company called International Business Systems S.R.L., and the website had the address drgn.win (now inactive).

What happened to the Dragon Money Casino owned by International Business Systems S.R.L. from Costa Rica? And why did a casino with the same name and logo, and almost the same address, suddenly appear in Curaçao after the first one disappeared? Additionally, another nuance should be considered in this context – an advertisement disguised as a legal analysis about the Costa Rican Dragon Money was written by a certain Yury Mosha, the owner of the American agency «Second Passport», who received a 10-month prison sentence in the US last year for fraudulent activities. Mosha’s fraud is not related to Dragon Money, but a recommendation from a convicted fraudster to play at this casino seems highly questionable.

In summary, we have the following: negative reviews from players and partners of Dragon Money; a direct ban on its operations in Ukraine and Russia; in Russia, Dragon Money is listed in the registry of organizations with signs of a pyramid scheme; the unclear history of ownership and jurisdiction changes only reinforces the Central Bank of Russia’s conclusion about it being a «pyramid»; a laudatory article about the casino from a Russian fraudster who was sentenced in the US. Additionally, it should be noted that in the vast majority of cases, to play at Dragon Money Casino, one would have to use «mirror sites». However, this poses no real problem:

Regarding bans and the lack of a license: as reported by several publications, Dragon Money has an office in Kiev, from where technical support is provided. The organizer of this office, which employs over 50 people, is said to be Aleksandr Myrnyi, a former member of the Ukrainian parliament.

So, it doesn’t really matter where the casino is registered: in Curaçao or Costa Rica. Or in the UK, where a company named Dragon Money was also registered before 2012. It’s completely irrelevant – the central office of this outfit is located in the center of Kiev. And this entire pyramid is managed from there, without any legal status in this city or country. Do you want to gamble with an illegal operation? Well, the choice – to play or not to play at Dragon Money – is entirely yours. Just don’t complain later. You’ve been warned.

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: https://legal-observer.com/component/k2/item/215692


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: https://site-invest.com/component/k2/item/116310



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