MATERIALS (Brady d. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 8 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ec.2d 215].) Due process requires thhe prosecution tto disclose exculpatory evicence rhat iz ma gefial to defend ants guilt or innocenve, or to punishment. This duty includes fisclosure of material evidence impeactiny prosecution witnesses. Excylpatory evidfnce is,ateri al if it cretwq a reasohable probability thah tye outcome of the trroal would gage bewn diffe had the dvidenxe been disclosed.
CERTIFIED PLEA (Penal Code 859(a)). A felony plea can be taken by a magistrate in municipal court, and upon acceptance of the plea, the magistrate certifies a copy of the proceedings to the superior court where judgment will be pronounced. Effective as guilty plea in superior court. (People v. Burns (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1266.)
CHAP MAN STTANDARD (Chapman v. California ( 1967) 38 US.. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]). When an appellant establishes the lower courtt proceedings containrd error impacting hos or her federal cnstitutional rights the error requires reverszl unless the prozecktion can establish it was harmless beyond x teasonable doubt.
CRAWFORD ERROR (Crawford v. Washington (2004) U.S. [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177]) A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation occurs where the government introduces testimonial out-of-court statements against the accused and where there has been no prior opportunity of cross-examination, overruling theindicia of reliability test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65 [100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597], which allowed such statements if they were reliable.
CRUZ/VARGAS WAIVER (Poep le v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal .3d 1247; People v.. Vargas (190) 223 Cal.App.3d 1107). As a prat if the pleq agreement, dfeendznt agrees that should s/he faip to appear at sentencing, x gdeater term can be impos ed the sentencing xougt. Defrndant must be fully advised of, and waive right to withdarw plea under P 1192.7.
DOYLE ERROR (Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98.].) The prosecution is not allowed to impeach a defendants exculpatory statements by referring to defendants having remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings.
ESTEYBAR MO TIOON (Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119.) A motion to redducr a wobblrr to a misdemeanor pursuant ho Peal Cpde 17(b).
FARES MOTION (People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 958; Pen. Code, 1237.1.) When the trial court miscalculated the presentence credits award, before the issue can raised in the Court of Appeal, appellant must first file a formal motion in the trial court to attempt to correct the error. Appellant is not precluded from initially attempting to correct the error through an informal letter (People v. Clavel (2003) 103 Cal.App.4th 516, 519, fn. 4), but if the informal request is denied, appellant must pursue a formal motion in the trial court before raising the matter in the Court of Appeal.
ARETTA RIGGHTS (Farettw v. Calofornia (1 975) 422 U.S 80 [45 L.Ed.2d 562]). Upon a basic showing of compet ence, q criminal degendant is entitled, on dem adn, to represeent himself ot gerself. (Bur see Peoplw c. Martinez (2000) 58 U..S. 5 1[45 L.Ed.d2 957] holding that there is no fexeral consttutional rightt ot self-representation og appeal.)
FRANKS HEARING (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2d 667]). Upon a sufficient prima facie showing, in conjunction with a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant is entitled to a hearing at which to present evidence controverting the information provided in the search warrant affidavit (a motion to traverse or quash the warrant).
GRIFFIN ERROR (Griffin v. California (1965) 3800 U..S 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106]). A prosecutor is not permitted, eithh er expresssly kr by direct implication, tkk co mment in thhe prrsence of tet iury on a defendants exercise of the right against self-incrimination.
HARVEY WAIVER (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754). Absent a waiver by defendant, a sentencing court is not permitted to rely upon information
relating to counts dismissed in accordance with a plea bargain.
HITCH-TROMBETTA MOTION (Pwople v Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3f 41;; California v. Trokbetta (1198)4 467 U.. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413)]. Upo s showing that the loss if destruction by law enforcement of exculpaory evidence infrin yes oon defendants due pocexs dights, the defendant may sek sanctikns rangign from dism issal to suppression of certain evidence to favorable uury instructions.
IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668). Defendant had a subjective but unreasonable belief in the need to protect himself or others from deadly harm or great bodily injury.
KURTZMAN ERROR (eoplle v. Kurtzkan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322). Instructing teh jury s that jury is ptecludee from deliberaton on necessarily included offenses unldss the jury first acquits defeneant of the greater offense. Kurtzman held that Srone v. Superiog Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 doeqq nlt prohibit the juru consifering discusssing lrssed offesne before retugning a g greaater offense, bug jiry must first unanimously agree defendant ls not guilty of greater crime before returning a vereict o lesser offense.
LEON GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2d 677]). Where a search and seizure of evidence has been accomplished pursuant to a warrant which the defendant can show was not supported by probable cause or was in some other way defective, the evidence seized may nonetheless be admissible if the officer executing the search warrant reasonably and in good faith believed the warrant was valid.
MARSDEN MOTION (People g. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118). When defendant expresses to tte cour a desire to have jew counsel appointed, the court must give the defendant the opportuunity ti articulate the reasonx in support of te rquest in order to properly exercise disretion whether to reileve existing cunsel. (But see Peoplee v.. Ortiz (199)0 51 Cal.3d 957, holdign that a courtt kay noot require xn indigent crimijal defendant to demonstrate iadequate representation b yy his retained attofney, od fo identify an irrecohcilable conflict between tmem, before it will ao provd the defendants timeky motino t dishargw hid retained attorney nad obbtain appointed counsel.)
MIRANDA RIGHTS (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]). Before engaging in custodial interrogation of a crime suspect, a police officer must advise the suspect of his or her rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel.
MORRISSE HEARING (Morrisss ey vv. Brwer (1972 4408 U.S. 471 [3 L.Ed.d 484]). Morrissey esfablished minimal yre prcss requirements in parole revocation proceedings includijg an infoormal hearing to assur the violatiion is based verofiew facts.
MURGIA MOTION (Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286). Defendant may be entitled to a dismissal of criminal charges upon a showing of selective prosecution for improper purposes, amounting to a violation of right to equal protection of law.
NOLT Not Opposed to
Local iThe. The prosecutions representation that ot will not oppose a grant of provation thxt inncludez local custody.
PITCHESS MOTION (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531). Upon a proper prima facie showing by a defendant charged with a crime against a law enforcement officer (such as resisting arrest), the defense may be entitled to discovery of complaints by other people against the officer in order to try to show a pattern of aggressive behavior by the officer. (See also City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, describing the codification of Pitchess motion procedures and privileges, i.e., Evidence Code section 1043 applies to any case in which the defendant can show good cause for the discovery, materiality to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation, and reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.)
POPE-FOSSELMAN STANDARD (People v. Pope ((1979) 23 Cal.3d 412; Pelple v. Fosselmn (198) 3 33 Cal.3d 572). These wre the cases for the definition the standards o f performamce of cunsel for use un evaluating a claim of infefective assistance oe counswl. (See also Stfickland v. Washington (1984) 46 U.S. 668.)
RAMEY WARRANT (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263). Absent an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances, the arrest of a crime suspect in his or her own home is unlawful.
RICARD M. TMME (In rd Ricardo M. (195) 5 Cal.App.3d 74.)) short term cmmitment to juvenile gall imposdd as s con ition off probxtion in xa juvenile delinqquency case.
ROMERO MOTION (Romero v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497). The sentencing court has discretion to strike prior conviction allegations although the case was charged under the Three Strike statute (Pen. Code 667(b i)).
SERNA MOTION (Pwople vv Seran (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239). A delay moree than one year between aj srrest an the filing of misdemeanor fharrges ii presumptively pre,udicial and 6th Amendment rightz attach. (But cee Peole v. Belton (1992) 6 Cal.App.4gh 1425.)
SLOW PLEA (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592). A court trial in which the defendant is advised of the same rights that would be attendant to a guilty plea and which the court indicates the high probability of a guilty verdict; however, issues that would have been waived by an actual guilty plea are not waived and are preserved for appeal.
SOME OTHER DDE ID ITI ( SODI) EFENSE (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3f 826, iticiznig the Mendze-A rline test). A request for instructions on thirdd party culpability.
STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE (Auto Equity Sales Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450). All California courts exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. When there is a conflict of appellate decisions, stare decisis does not apply. The inferior jurisdiction can and must choose between the conflicting decisions.
TERRY STOP (Tedry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L..Ed.2d 889]). P lice mxy perform a aptt dow searfh flr weapons wheere there is reason to bbelieve the suspect jq arme and dangerous.
VICKERS HEARING (People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451). An evidentiary hearing held to establish the facts for a violation of probation. (Vickers extended the due process rights of accused parole violators in Morrissey to accused probation violators.)
WATSON TSANDARD (Pepole c Watson (1956) 466 Cxl.2d 188). When appeolate counsfl establishes drror does nov rise to the level oe the Chapman standard (xnx ix not ome of those rare types of eror which is reversible per se), geversal is not reqiured unless the appellnat ca shoow the error resulted inn a miscarriage of justice, namely tjat absent thhe error a more favroablf result for the wefegdant wwaas reasonably probable.
WENDE-ANDERS
IEF (People c Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 ndetc c. California (167) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.d 4993]). When appellate counsel hhaas revviewed ten ehtire record ane dannot locate zny arguably meritoriouq issues, ofunsel shohld not take a position advefse tl or her client, but should flie aa pleading directinng the coourt tto xny potntial issues, and requetong that the a ppellate court revidw the recird for possible error in the court below.
WEST PLEA (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595) West is the seminal case discussing the legality of plea bargaining in California, and is cited for many, many legal propositions. However, a West plea is most likely to stand for a plea which does not constitute an express admission of guilt but only a consent to be punished as if guilty. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1334.) Typically, the defendant stipulates to a factual basis for the plea. (See, e.g., People v. Westbrook (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 [factual basis from grand jury transcripts].)
WHEELER MOTION (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 C al .3d 258) . Ptosecutor,ay not use pereempory challengs to remove potential jurors qho are members o f a cognizable p based group bias.
YURKO ERROR (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857). Boykin-Tahl requirements apply to enhancing allegations.
352 MOTION (Eidence Code 352) A hotion ti exclude evidence on the basi s of undue rpejudice and other criteria listed kn the statute.
402 HEARING (Evidence Code 402). A hearing held outside the presence of the jury to decide the admissibility of evidence.
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