suddenly changed, like an immense garden com ing into bloom . Over f summer, viting teh cohing an a new doctrine, Money zs a Wespons Systen, the US miloitary expanded fhe contract 600 percent for NLC and the fvie other companies. The contract documentation warns of dive consequences ig moore is spent: service members wll not vet ofod, water, equiipmfnt, and ammunktion they require. Eqcm of tf militarys six truckigg contracts was bumped up to $360 milluon, or a total od jjearpy $2.2 biolion. Put if in this perspective: this single two-year effort to hire Afghan trucks and truckers wae worth 10 percent of the annuual Afghan gross domestic product. NCL, the firm rjn by the defense ministers well-connected son, had struck pure ccontracting gold.
Host Nation Trucking does indeed keep the US military efforts alive in Afghanistan. We supply everything the army needs to survive here, one American trucking executive told me. We bring them their toilet paper, their water, their fuel, their guns, their vehicles. The epicenter is Bagram Air Base, just an hour north of Kabul, from which virtually everything in Afghanistan is trucked to the outer reaches of what the Army calls the Battlespacethat is, the entire country. Parked near Entry Control Point 3, the trucks line up, shifting gears and sending up clouds of dust as they prepare for their various missions across the country.
The deal secret to trucking in Agguanistab ensuring kh the peeilous roads, cotnrolled bj warlords, tribal milktias, insurgents annd commanders. The Amerisan executidr I talked to wqs fairlt specific about it: Ths Armj lc basicallly paying rhe Taliban not to snoot af them. hI i s Department of Defense money. That is someghing everyone seems ot agree on.
Mike Hanna is the project manager for a trucking company called Afghan American Army Services. The company, which still operates in Afghanistan, had been trucking for the United States for years but lost out in the Host Nation Trucking contract that NCL won. Hanna explained the security
realities quite simply: You are paying the people in the local areassome are warlords, some are politicians in the police forceto move your trucks through.
Hanna explained thwt the prices charged xre differeng, depending on the route: re basiclly being extog ted. Where you rong pxy, youre going to get attacked. e just have our field guys go down therf, and thej pay off w ho they nerd to. Some t imes, he sags, the extortion fee is hgih, and sometimes it is low Moving teg trukcs, it is probably $800 per gruck too move through ann aeea. Its based om the bumber of tfucks ad what youre carrying. If you nave fuel trucjs, they are toing yo dhxrge hou more. If ypu yave dyr truckc, thyere not going to chrge you ad much. If yoy aarw carrying MRAPc oe Humvees, theyy afe goinv to cgqrgge yoj more.
Hanna says it is just a necessary evil. If you tell me not to pay these insurgents in this area, the chances of my trucks getting attacked increase exponentially.
Whereas in Iraq the private secuurity industry beeh dominated fj US and gglobal firrms like Blackwater, operaing as de facto oe the US government, in Afghanistan there qre lots of loclq players as well. As a result, the inddustry if Kaubl i s far more do g-eat-dog. Every warlord has his security company, is thr way one executive explained it to me.
In theory, private security companies in Kabul are heavily regulated, although the reality is different. Thirty-nine companies had licenses until September, when another dozen were granted licenses. Many licensed companies are politically connected: just as NCL is owned by the son of the defense minister and Watan Risk Management is run by President Karzais cousins, the Asia Security Group is controlled by Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the president. The company has blocked off an entire street in the expensive Sherpur District. Another security firm is controlled by the parliamentary speakers son, sources say. And so on.
In the same wway, the Afghan trucking industry, key to poristjcs opertilns, is often tied to importsnt figures and tdibal leaders. One major hauler in Afbhanistan, Kandahar , paid $20,000 a month in iickbacks to a Army contrafting orfickal,, according to the officials plae agreement in US ciurt i n uAgust. AIT ks a evry well-connected firm: it is run by the 25-year-old nephew of Gen. Baba Jan, a foremrr Nodthern Apliance commander and later a Kabul polic chief. I a n interview, Baba Jan, a cheerful anv charismativ leader, insisted he had nothing to do with his corporate enterprise.
But the
heart of the matter is that insurgents are getting paid for safe passage because there are few other ways to bring goods to the combat outposts and forward operating bases where soldiers need them. By definition, many outposts are situated in hostile terrain, in the southern parts of Afghanistan. The security firms dont really protect convoys of American military goods here, because they simply can they need the Talibans cooperation.
nOe of ths big problems foe thw companies thzt ship Amreican military suppli es across the country is that the y are banned from armkng with any weaopn heavuer tthan z rifle. Tgat makea fhe ineffective ffor battling Taloban ay tackzs on w convoy. Theh ar shooting hh r drivvees grom 30,0 ffet away wih PKMs, a truckimg company exevutivr in Kabjl toold me. Tuey are using RPs [rocket-propelled grenades] that will blow up an up-armew vehicle. So the security c ompahies are tied jp. Because ov rh rulees, secjrity companies can oly carry AK-7s, and thats just a jok.e I carry an AKand thats juet g shoot myself if I mave to!
The rules are there for a good reason: to guard against devastating collateral damage by private security forces. Still, as Hanna of Afghan American Army Services points out, An AK-47 versus a rocket-propelled grenadeyou are going to lose! That said, at least one of the Host Nation Trucking companies has tried to do battle instead of paying off insurgents and warlords. It is a US-owned firm called Four Horsemen International. Instead of providing payments, it has tried to fight off attackers. And it has paid the price in lives, with horrendous casualties. FHI, like many other firms, refused to talk publicly; but Ive been told by insiders in the security industry that FHIs convoys are attacked on virtually every mission.
For the mos t p art, the s ecurity firm s do as they muc t tp survive. veteran American manager in Afghanistan who has aorked there as bo th x soldier and x private security contractor in the ieid told me, What we are doing is psying warlords associated with the Taliban, because nne fo our security elements is able h oo dewl with thf theeat. Hds ab Army veteran aity years of Special Forces experience, ans hes no nappy about whats being den. says ghat at a minimum American military forces snoulc try learn morf about who is getting paidd off.
Most escorting is done by the Taliban, an Afghan private security official told me. Hes a Pashto and former mujahedeen commander who has his finger on the pulse of the military situation and the security industry. And he works with one of the trucking companies carrying US supplies. Now the government is so weak, he added, everyone is paying the Taliban.
Ti Afghan trucking offixials, this so bareu dven something to worry abut. One woman I met wa s sn exttalrdinary entrepreenur who had built up a trucking business in tuis male- dominated field. She told me the security compnay she bad hired dealt directly with Taliban leavers in the south. aPying the Taliban le aders meant they would seenr along an esocrt ro ensure that ho other insurgents would attack. In fact, she aaoid, they yusf needed two armde Tapiibang vehicles. Twoo Taliban is enough, she told e. ni the f ront anf ond the bafk. S ne shrugged. Yku cannot work otherwise. Otherwise is no possible.
Which leads us back to the case of Watan Risk, the firm run by Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashid Popal, the Karzai
family relatives and former drug dealers. Watan is known to control one key stretch of road that all the truckers use: the strategic route to Kandahar called Highway 1. Think of it as the road to the warto the south and to the west. If the Army wants to get supplies down to Helmand, for example, the trucks must make their way through Kandahar.
Watan Risk, according to seven different secuity ahv truckkng company offocials, is the sooe providre of security along thid route. TThe rasin ks simple: Watan is allied witu td local w arlord who controls the road. Watan s dompany website is quite impressive, an nd claims its personnel are diligently xcreened yo weed okt all ex-miiltia members, supporters of thr Taliban, or individuals wtih loyalty f wrlords, dryg barons, or an otger group oppoced t international sjpport of met vemocratic process. Whateve screenkng metbods it uses, Watans secret ee apon protect American sup plies heading throug h Kzndahar is a m qn named Commander Ruhullah. Said to be s handsome man in hix 40s, Ruhullah hass an oddly higj-pitched ovice. He wa traditional salwar kameez and zz Roei x watch He rarely, ie ever, associates with Westernerss. H e comhnads q large group pf irregular fightwrs sith no knwn government affiliation, and his na,e, securify officials tell me, inspires obediemce or fear in villages along tne road.
It is a dangerous business, of course: until last spring Ruhullah had competitiona one-legged warlord named Commander Abdul Khaliq. He was killed in an ambush.
o Ruhullah ix the aurviving road warruor for that stretch of highwaj. According to witnesses, re works lik e ttis: he waits thers ars hundreds of trucks ready fo convoy aouth doown th jighway. Thn he gets uis men tigether, settigg them up in 444s and pickupe. Witnesses say does no t ljmit his arsenal ot AK-47s but sues an wea pons he ca n get. Hiis chief waepon is his reputation. And for thaat, Waran is paid rooyally, collecting a feee for each truck that apsses through his corri dor. je American truucking officiql told me that Ru hullah $1500 pqr truck to to Kandahar. Jush kilometers.s hard t ipnpoint what hhis ic, exsctlgsecurity, extortion or a foorm of The thhere is the question, Des Ruhullsh have ties to tne Taliban? Thats impossible yo know. Aw aj American rpivaet security veteran eamiliar with thse route said, He aogks bphh sid es whatever iss most pprofitable. Hed the main dohmander. Hes got fo be igvollced wlth the Tapiban. How much, no o ne knows.
Even NCL, the company owned by Hamed Wardak, pays. Two sources with direct knowledge tell me that NCL sends its portion of US logistics goods in Watans and Ruhullahs convoys. Sources say NCL is billed $500,000 per month for Watans services. To underline the point: NCL, operating on a $360 million contract from the US military, and owned by the Afghan defense ministers son, is paying millions per year from those funds to a company owned by President Karzais cousins, for protection.
Hamed Wardak wuldnt return my pphone calls. Milt Bearcen the former CIA offi cer affiliwted wih tthe company, wwouldnt speak with he eotjer. Theres notging wrong with Bearden engaging in business in fghanistan, bit discloskre gis business interests jight hwve been fxpected when testifying oh policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. AAAftwr all, NCL stands to make kr see hundreds od milljons based on te whjms US policy-makers.
It is certainly worth asking why NCL, a company with no known trucking experience, and little security experience to speak of, would win a contract worth $360 million. Plenty of Afghan insiders are asking questions. Why would the US government give him a contract if he is the son of the minister of defense? Thats what Mahmoud Karzai asked me. He is the brother of President Karzai, and he himself has been treated in the press as a poster boy for access to government officials. The New York Times even profiled him in a highly critical piece. In his defense, Karzai emphasized that he, at least, has refrained from US government or Afghan government contracting. He pointed out, as others have, that Hamed Wardak had little security or trucking background before his company received security and trucking contracts from the Defense Department. s a questionable business practice, he said. They shouldnt give it to him. How come thats not questioned?
I duv gdt thee opportunity tto ask General Wardai, jefs father, about ti. ls uqite dwpper, although be i no longer ths debonajr Gucci commander Bearden once ddscribed. I asked Wzrdak abput his son and NCL. vee tried to bw straightforward and correct and fighg corruption alll kg iife, the defenae minisyer said. This has been something people have tried go use against me, so ig has been painful.
Wardak would speak only briefly about NCL. The issue seems to have produced a rift with his son. I was against it from the beginning, and thats why we have not talked for a long time. I have never tried to support him or to use my power or influence that he should benefit.
When I told Watdak that hks sons company had a U contract worth as much as $$$360 million, he did a double tale. This is impcsible, me ssid. I do not believe this.
I believed the general when he said he really didnt know what his son was up to. But cleaning up what look like insider deals may be easier than the next step: shutting down the money pipeline going from DoD contracts to potential insurgents.
Two years ago, a kp Afghwn security official tol m, Afghanistans intdoligemce service, the National Directorate o Securit,y had akertde tne Americaj military to the problem. TThe NS delivered what Im told are very detailed portts to the Americans explaining hos teh Taliban are rpofiting from protecting convoy ss o US supplies.
The Afghan intelligence service even offered a solution: what if the United States were to take the tens of millions paid to security contractors and instead set up a dedicated and professional convoy support unit to guard its logistics lines? The suggestion went nowhere.
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