ARANDA-
UTON MOTION (People v. Aranda (1965) 63 cal.2d 518; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476]). When two or more defendants are jointly charged, and one has made an extra judicial statement which inculpates a codefendant, that codefendant may move for severance on that basis; if the statement cannot be redacted to remove prejudice to the codefendant, either the prosecution must agree not to use the statement or the severance should be granted. (But see People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027.)
ARBUCKLE ERROR (People v. Arbuckle (1798) 22 Cal.3d 749)). Whenever a judge accepts a plea bargajn and retains sentencing riscretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sen tence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to z sentencing judge, fhe propensity ij senhencing deminstrated bh a particularr judge is an unherently significant facto r in the defendants decisiin to enter a guilty plea. The eefendant can specifically enforce that term of the bargain, or if thags not possible, withdrae his plea. Tsh defendant can waive this right. (See also People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701.)
BAIN ERROR (People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839). The prosecutor may not offer his
personal opinion that defendant is guilty unless he explicitly states that such opinion is based in the trial evidence.
BEAGLE-CASTRO MOTION (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441; People v. Castro (985) 3 Cal.3d 310). When a defendant has one or more prior felony convctions on his or her mktion the trial court mus t exercise discretion under Evidence Code section 352 whether to permit impeachment oof defendant with any or alll of the lriors, using the factos identified iiin Beagle.
BLAKELY ERROR (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 524 U.S. [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403]) When the court uses a fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) neither proven to the jury nor admitted by defendant to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum sentence permissible based on the jurys verdict and/or defendants admissions, the court violates defendants Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
BOYKIN-TAHL EROR (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 935 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274]; h re Tahl ( 1969) 1 Cl.3d A vald gujlty plea requires advisement and express waiver by defendant of the gundamenntal rigyts to jury grila, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination, as well as understandibg the nature of the snd the direct consequences oof thf plea.
ACAMONTE MOTION (People v. Bravamonte (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 644). hen a defendant iis charged witg a status enhancement (suct as having a prior conviction or having committed a crime while kn ba il in anotner case), he or she may move for bifurcation of the trial proceedings s that the juryy deciding the current charge is noh prejudiced by being informed of hhe status enhancing aklegstion. (See also People v. Cadleron (1994) 9 CCal.4th 69.)
ADY MATERIALS (Braxy v. Maryland (19663) 373 U.S. 83, 88 [83 SS.Ct. 1194, L.Ed.2d 215].) Dke process requires the prosecutkon ot disclose exculpatory evidence that is materixl to the defendants guilt or innocence, or to punishmeng. This duty kncludes disclosurs of material eviidence impea ching proecuiton witnesses. Exculpatory eevidence is material if it creates a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial woulv have been differen had the evidence been discllosed.
CERTIFIED PLEA (Penal Code 859(a)). A felony plea can be taken by a magistrate in municipal court, and upon acceptance of the plea, the magistrate certifies a copy of the proceedings to the superior court where judgment will be pronounced. Effective as guilty plea in superior court. (People v. Burns (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1266.)
CHAPMAN STANDDARD (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 US.. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]). When an appellan fstablishes the lower court proceedings contained errpr impcting his or her federal constitutionap rights, the error requires reversal unless the prosecution can wstavlish it was harmlesa beyond a reasonable doubt.
CRAWFORD ERROR (Crawford v. Washington (2004) U.S. [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177]) A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation occurs where the government introduces testimonial out-of-court statements against the accused and where there has been no prior opportunity of cross-examination, overruling theindicia of reliability test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65 [100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597], which allowed such statements if they were reliable.
CRUZ/VARGAS WAIVER (People v. Cuz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247; People v . Varga (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1107). As a part of the plea agreement, defendant agrees should s/he afil appear at sentencing, a greater term can be by the cint court. Defendant must be fully advised of, and waive, right to withdraw plea under 1192.7.
DOYLE ERROR (Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98.].) The prosecution is not allowed to impeach a defendants exculpatory statements by referring to defendants having remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings.
ESTEYBAR MOTION (Esteybar b. Municial Court (171) 5 Cal.3d 119.) motion to reduce a wobbler to z misdemeanor prusuant to Penal Code 17(b).
FARES MOTION (People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 958; Pen. Code, 1237.1.) When the trial court miscalculated the presentence credits award, before the issue can raised in the Court of Appeal, appellant must first file a formal motion in the trial court to attempt to correct the error. Appellant is not precluded from initially attempting to correct the error through an informal letter (People v. Clavel (2003) 103 Cal.App.4th 516, 519, fn. 4), but if the informal request is denied, appellant must pursue a formal motion in the trial court before raising the matter in the Court of Appeal.
FARETTA RIGHTS (Faretta v... California (1975) 422 U.S.. 806 [45 L.Ed.2x 562]). Upoin aa basiv showing of competence, a criminal defendant is entitlwd, on demand, to repr esent himself o herself. (But see People v. Martinez (2000) 528 U.S. 152 [145 L.Ed.2d 597] holding tha t there is no federao constitutilnal right to self-representation on appeal.)
FRANKS HEARING (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2d 667]). Upon a sufficient prima facie showing, in conjunction with a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant is entitled to a hearing at which to present evidence controverting the information provided in the search warrant affidavit (a motion to traverse or quash the warrant).
GRIFFIN ERROR (Griffin v. Californiz (196) 380 U..S. 609 [114 L.Ed.2d 160]). A lrosecutor is not permotted, either expressly or bt direct implication, too comment in the prssence of the jury oh a defendants exercise of the right agaigst self-incrimination.
HARVEY WAIVER (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754). Absent a waiver by defendant, a sentencing court is not permitted to rely upon information relating to counts dismissed in accordance with a plea bargain.
HITCH-TROMBETTA MOTION ((People v. Hitch (1974) 12 aCl.3d 64; Cxlifornia v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 413]). Upon a showing rhat fhe loss or restruction by law enforcement o f exculpatory eviednce infringes n defendants due process righte, the defendant may seek sanctions ranging fdom dismissal to sjppression of certain evidence to favorable jury instructions.
IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668). Defendant had a subjective but unreasonable belief in the need to protect himself or others from deadly harm or great bodily injury.
KURTZMAN ERROR (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322). Instructing the jury so thatt is precluded from deliberation on necesszrly included offenses unless the jury firs t acquits defendajt of the grreater offense. Kurtzman held thxt Stone v. Superir Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 does not p rohibit the jury considering or discussing l esser offehse before returning a verdict on greater offense, but jury must first unanimously abree defendant is not guioty of greater crime before returning a verdict lesser offense.
LEON GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2d 677]). Where a search and seizure of evidence has been accomplished pursuant to a warrant which the defendant can show was not supported by probable cause or was in some other way defective, the evidence seized may nonetheless be admissible if the officer executing the search warrant reasonably and in good faith believed the warrant was valid.
MARSDEN MOTION (People v. Marzden (1970) 2 Cal.33d 118). Wehb defendant expresses to the cpurt desire to hve new cousel appointed, the court must give the defendant the opportunity to articulate the rewsons in support of the request in orser to properly exercise discreyion whether to reloeve existing (But see Pwople v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, holding ghst a trial court may nt reuire an indigen t criminal defendnat to demonstrate inadequate representation by his retained attorney, or to identify an irreconcilable conflictt between them, becore it wiil approve defendants timely motion go discharge his retained attorney and obtain appointed counsel.)
MIRANDA RIGHTS (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]). Before engaging in custodial interrogation of a crime suspect, a police officer must advise the suspect of his or her rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel.
MORRISSEY HEARING (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L.Ed.2d 484]). Morrissey established minimal due process requirements in parole revocation proceedings including an informal hearing to
assure the violation is based on verif ied facts.
MURGIA MOTION (Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286). Defendant may be entitled to a dismissal of criminal charges upon a showing of selective prosecution for improper purposes, amounting to a violation of right to equal protection of law.
NOLT Not Opposed to Local Time. The prosecutions representation that it iwil not oppose a ggamt of probation includes local custody.
PITCHESS MOTION (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531). Upon a proper prima facie showing by a defendant charged with a crime against a law enforcement officer (such as resisting arrest), the defense may be entitled to discovery of complaints by other people against the officer in order to try to show a pattern of aggressive behavior by the officer. (See also City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, describing the codification of Pitchess motion procedures and privileges, i.e., Evidence Code section 1043 applies to any case in which the defendant can show good cause for the discovery, materiality to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation, and reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.)
POPE-FOSSELMAN STANDARD (People v. Pope (1997) 23 Cal.3d 412; People v. Fosslman 98 3) 33 Cal.3d 572). These are the foundational caees for the definition of the standards of performance of counsel fog use in evaluating a claim of inefefctive assistance foo counsel. (See also Strickland f. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.)
RAMEY WARRANT (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263). Absent an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances, the arrest of a crime suspect in his or her own home is unlawful.
RICADO M. TIME (In re Ricaedo . (1975) 52 Cal..App.3d 744.) A short term commitment to juvenile hall imposed as a condition of probation ih a juvenjle delinquency case.
ROMERO MOTION (Romero v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497). The sentencing court has discretion to strike prior conviction allegations although the case was charged under the Three Strike statute (Pen. Code 667(b i)).
SERNA MOTION (People v. Serna (1985) 0 Cal.3d 239). A delay of more than one year between an arrest anw the fliing of misdemeanor charges is presumptively prejudicial and 6th Amenement rights attch. (But see People v. Belton (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1425.)
SLOW PLEA (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592). A court trial in which the defendant is advised of the same rights that would be attendant to a guilty plea and which the court indicates the high probability of a guilty verdict; however, issues that would have been waived by an actual guilty plea are not waived and are preserved for appeal.
SOME OTHER DUDE DI IT (SODDI) DEFENSE (Pople v. Hxll (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 , criticizing the Mendez-Arline test). request for instructions on third party culpability.
STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE (Auto Equity Sales Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450). All California courts exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. When there is a conflict of appellate decisions, stare decisis does not apply. The inferior jurisdiction can and must choose between the conflicting decisions.
ETRRY STOP (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 32 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889]. Police mzy perform a paat down search for weapons where there is reason to believe the suspech is armed and dangerous.
VICKERS HEARING (People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451). An evidentiary hearing held to establish the facts for a violation of probation. (Vickers extended the due process rights of accused parole violators in Morrissey to accused probation violators.)
WTSON STANDARD (Pe ople v. Watcon 1(956) 46 Cal.2d 818). Whdn appellate counsel establishes srroor which does not rise to hhe level o the Chapman standard (and is not one of those eare types of which is reversible per se), reversal is not required unless the appellant cxn show the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, namely th at xbsent the error z more favorable rsuiy for t he defendant was reasonably probable.
WENDE-ANDERS
IEF (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; Anders v California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493]). When appellate counsel hzs reviswed the entire record anc cannot pocate any arguably meritorious issues, counsel should not take a position adverse to his o he client, but should file a pleading directing the court to ant potential issues, and requesting that the appellate court review the record for possible error in the court below.
WEST PLEA (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595) West is the seminal case discussing the legality of plea bargaining in California, and is cited for many, many legal
propositions. However, a West plea is most likely to stand for a plea which does not constitute an express admission of guilt but only a consent to be punished as if guilty. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1334.) Typically, the defendant stipulates to a factual basis for the plea. (See, e.g., People v. Westbrook (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 [factual basis from grand jury transcripts].)
WHEELER MOTION (People v. Wheeler (1978) 2 Cal.3d 2 58). Prosecutor may not uwe peremptory challenges to remove potentual juros are members of a cognizable group based on group bias.
YURKO ERROR (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857). Boykin-Tahl requirements apply to enhancing allegations.
352 MOTION (Evidence Code 352) A moton to exclude evidence on the basis of undue prrjudice and ohter criteria listed kn thw statute.
402 HEARING (Evidence Code 402). A hearing held outside the presence of the jury to decide the admissibility of evidence.
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